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Director: Bill Chaloupka
This study examines the extent and importance of the real estate market value 
(permit value) of Forest Service grazing permits and Bureau of Land 
Management grazing leases. This value is not officially recognized by either 
agency, although it does influence the IRS calculation of inheritance taxes 
since it is considered to increase the total assessed value of a ranch. Permit 
value is traced through its historical and legal development. The theories as to 
why this value exists are explored. The numerous economic studies that have 
attempted to enumerate permit value in a specific region or trace the total 
extent of permit value throughout the 11 Western states are collected and their 
methods and results are discussed.
Informal interviews and surveys were conducted with forty-three 
individuals who have varying connections to the current political conflict 
over public land grazing. These interviews focused on discussing the political 
and economic importance of permit value in an attempt to assess the political
viability of various proposed new management tools. These individuals
included ranchers, both with and without grazing allotments, public land 
managers, academics, environmental activists, bankers, a Realtor and a 
newspaper reporter. Results showed that it is generally acknowledged that 
these permits and leases do have real estate value. More than two-thirds felt, 
that this value had at least a significant influence on ranchers' opposition to 
grazing level reductions. Most felt that some new management tools would be 
helpful and more than half supported, to various degrees, plans to compensate 
ranchers for reductions in their grazing privileges or options to buy-out 
allotm ents entirely.
Various issues that affect public land grazing and which need to be 
considered when examining new management tools are discussed and then 
some new management plans are discussed. Finally, a hybrid proposal is 
offered that might make grazing reforms more politically viable by
considering and compensating ranchers for permit value as their permitted 
stocking rates are reduced or voluntarily eliminated.
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CHAPTER 1 
UNDERSTANDING PERMIT VALUE: 
One step towards a solution
INTRODUCTION: Why the controversy?
Often overshadowed by the more intense debates and struggles involving 
logging on National Forests or mining in ,the public domain, the debate over 
grazing on public land seems to phase in and out of the media's eye. But
gradually, grazing has become more and more of an issue for both
environmentalists and the public. What is at stake is the health and use of over
285 million acres of public land. These lands are loosely controlled by the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service, but used, often 
intensely, by ranchers for their cows, sheep and horses.
The problems surrounding that use are rooted in the economic and political 
structures that often allow overgrazing to continue, and surface as ecological 
bruises and scars. Overgrazing can lead to the loss of native grasses, the 
invasion of exotic plant species including noxious weeds, wildlife decline 
through loss of floral cover and habitat,, erosion of topsoil, problems with 
forest regeneration or increased fuel load, streambank shearing, stream 
widening and loss o f function, desertification through water table decline, 
stream sedimentation and the loss of fish spawning areas and the subsequent 
decline of fish populations.
Economically, low grazing fees for the use of these lands are called 
government subsidies by some, and necessity by others, who see many 
ranches barely surviving and worry about the effects of their loss to. western 
communities and landscapes. Politically, despite some common ground in the
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and varying definitions of "caring for the land" tend to divide people on the 
issue into a spectrum between the pro-extraction extremes of the Wise Use 
movement, and the "No Compromise" extremes of the environmental 
m ovem ent.
Currently, this split comes to light in the controversy taking place in many 
western states over the use of school lands for grazing. Environmentalists are 
arguing, with increasing success, that nonranchers should be able to bid on 
state grazing permits. The intent of the environmentalists, if successful, is to 
pay the state for the privilege of not grazing these lands. They would rest the 
land from livestock grazing, maintaining its flora for wildlife habitat and 
forage. Environmentalists argue that the states are legally bound to consider 
their bids because of constitutional requirements to maximize the long-term 
profits from the school land. Although the court battles continue, after years 
of agency petitioning and legal battles, the Forest Guardians were awarded the 
right to rest one state-controlled allotment that was abandoned by the rancher 
in 1996, and a second after outbidding a rancher by 50 an acre in 1997.1
Not surprisingly, ranchers are threatened by these bids on state lands, and 
not simply because of the impact of the loss of a few state grazing leases to a 
few ranchers. Undoubtedly they are even more worried about the public's 
perception of grazing if the state determines that grazing leases are not the 
best long-term use of public land. Ranchers are also worried, with good 
reason, about how these rulings and their ramifications will affect the use of 
federal lands. Although the federal government is not required to maximize 
profit from the land it leases, one of the reforms proposed by Secretary of 
Interior Bruce Babbitt's proposed "Rangeland Reform '94" (henceforth
1 The details of the Forest Guardians' successful bid were learned through a 
telephone conversation with their employee Sam Hitt on 4/15/98.
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abbreviated "RR '94") would allowed ranchers (or other who came to control 
federal allotments) to rest their allotments. This facet of the proposed reforms, 
along with a few others, has been taken to court and a final ruling is still 
p e n d in g .
The public land ranching community's resistance to reforms is based on 
several concerns: that the total land base available for ranching will diminish; 
that reforms will economically impact both individual ranchers and ranching 
communities; that ranches will fail and get sold to developers, resulting in a 
loss of open spaces; that grazing fees will climb, impacting yearly operations; 
and that the flora on allotments that are not grazed will become decadent, and 
prone to fire. These concerns are compounded by a fear that the price for 
ranches will continue to climb in many areas due to development trends that 
are pushing up land values. This could eliminate some old ranches, and 
decrease the likelihood of any new ranches.
For ranchers, the July, 1997 decision by the US Fish & Wildlife Service that 
declared 599 miles of Arizona's, New Mexico's and California's stream banks as 
critical habitat for the southwestern willow flycatcher, along with the 
expected restrictions resulting from that declaration, are even more scary. 
Once again, as was not uncommon in the last 20 years, ranchers and 
environmentalists will end up in court, with federal agencies in the middle.2
2 The following enlightening snapshot comes from the e-mail news service 
GREENLines Issue #424, July 17, 1997, greenlines@envirolink.org:
"RANCHERS TO SUE: The New Mexico Public Lands Council, representing 
3,500 ranchers in the state, filed a notice of intent to sue several federal 
agencies if restrictions on grazing in riparian areas are approved, according 
to a Santa Fe New Mexican article. The Council is acting in response to a 
notice of intent to sue [the agencies] by the Santa Fe group Forest Guardians 
for failing to protect the southwestern willow flycatcher and nine other 
threatened species from grazing. The ranchers argue that grazing may 
benefit the flycatcher. Forest Guardian's John Horning replies that, 'as long 
as they continue denying they're part of the problem, we'll end up in court.'"
With this most recent round, contesting habitat needs for a growing number 
of endangered species, the stakes are getting higher, as the grazing 
management provisions in the Forest Plans from eleven separate National 
Forests are under dispute.^
Ranchers have felt the pinching and pruning of these court cases for years, 
never knowing whose allotment will be cut back next, usually with no 
compensation. Many fear an eventual end to public land grazing. Although 
that is unlikely to happen any time soon, the cry, "Cattle Free in '93 "4 from 
many environmentalists still echoes in many a rancher's ear, perhaps also 
rekindling a more distant remembrance of the early moves to completely end 
grazing on the original forest reserves.
Despite these continued clashes, a counter development has attempted to 
bring ranchers and environmentalists to the same table. In some cases, such 
as the BLM's Resource Advisory Councils (RACs), they come to discuss each 
others concerns and to try to find some common ground that will allow the 
agencies to work with both more easily. In other areas, such as the Gray 
Ranch in New Mexico, or the Tipton Ranch in Nevada,^ ranchers are working 
with environmental groups on plans that emphasize ecologically based range 
management. Many more ranchers are attempting to do their best to show the 
public that ranching does not always destroy the land, and can at times help
3 "The Southwest Center has warned the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service that it 
will be sued if it backs down on draft opinion that the Southwest!s eleven 
National Forest Plans jeopardize seven threatened and endangered species 
with extinction." From the Southwest Center For Biological Diversity's 
7/17/97, "SOUTHWEST BIODIVERSITY ALERT #83."
4 Although I have not been able to trace the prigin of - this slogan, it may have 
come from Edward Abbey. Nevertheless, it is commonly used by both 
environmentalists and ranchers who write about the controversy.
5 As documented in Dan Dagget's, Beyond the Rangeland Conflict: Towards a 
West that Works. Layton, Utah: Gibbs-Smith, 1995.
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rehabilitate it. Although many environmentalists are truly pleased by these 
efforts, others cannot help but point out negative statistics. For example, they 
often note that 66% of the riparian habitat in BLM allotments is not in Proper 
Functioning Condition (USDI, BLM). Thus, the political and legal battles 
c o n tin u e .
So* in the midst of this controversy over public land grazing, is there any 
way to make significant political progress on these issues? It is unrealistic to 
suggest that the groups involved will ever reach consensus, but it may be that 
one important element of that debate remains largely overlooked by 
environmentalists and lawmakers, and even in part by the public lands 
ranchers that it most effects. That missing element may be fundamental to 
understanding the ranchers' resistance to changes in the management of 
public land grazing. It may be that a clear understanding and fair 
consideration of the importance of that element may ease the conflict and 
allow politicians and land managers to develop new options that allow for 
progress in this hundred year debate. These new options could both ease the 
ecological concerns of environmentalists and the economic concerns of 
ranchers. This important hidden element, permit value, is the. focus of this 
th esis .
GRAZING FEES: A MISPLACED FOCUS?
j
In a quick perusal of works on the history, politics or economics of public 
land grazing, the overwhelming impression would be that the dominant theme 
is the debate over grazing fees.^ Clearly there is much truth to that 
impression. That impression would surely be tempered by the growing
6 For historic background to the grazing fee debate, see the work of Calif, 
Clawson, Rowley, Paul Roberts, and Foss' Politics and Grass.
importance of environmental issues, but often even environmentalists get 
caught up in. the grazing fee debate. To some, the phrase, "low grazing fees aref
subsidies" becomes a mantra, for it works to bring the public's attention to an 
environmental issue by having them look at where their tax dollars are going.
At least part of the academic interest in the debate over fees is because of its
complexity. They raise many questions: Should fees be charged at all? How
should fee levels be determined? Are ranchers being subsided through low 
grazing fees? Are: low grazing fees costing taxpayer money? How do grazing 
fees relate to ranch prices? Do low grazing fees stabilize rural communities? 
The academic debate then filters out to the public, who usually look to the 
bottom line.
Throughout this varied debate, however, it is usually assumed that the fee 
itself is of paramount importance, The fee level does affect both the 
profitability of the ranch, and how much of the government's expenses for 
monitoring and maintaining the grazing program are recovered. Part of that 
fee-level debate, centers on whether the fee represents the fair market value 
of the forage the lease provides. Also, it is often argued that increased fees will 
put small ranches out of business. What is not often asked, however, is if there
are any equally important and possibly more fundamental issues that
contribute to making the fee debate so central.
WHAT IS PERMIT VALUE?
To clearly understand permit value, it is necessary to have a clear 
understanding of the benefits that leasing a public land grazing allotment 
have to a ranching operation. The fundamental benefit is that such a lease 
provides a source of relatively secure forage that allows the operation to run
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more cattle. Although allotment "*AUMs7 do occasionally get cut, only in rare 
instances do whole allotments get canceled. Generally a ranch can count on
this increase in forage to remain secure for at least ten years. In most cases, as 
long as they follow the legal requirements of their leases, they can keep their
leases for decades. In some areas, forage from allotments is also difficult to 
replace, simply because the surrounding pastures are in use. This makes 
ranchers feel dependent on their allotments. Further, even if it is available, 
replacement forage is usually more expensive than running stock on an
allotment. This is especially true in cases where the allotment abuts or is close 
to the ranch.
The question then becomes, "How real is that feeling of dependency?" 
Everyone admits that the fee for using federal allotments is clearly less than
the fees charged to lease private allotments. Many thus argue that the
ranchers should not be subsidized and the fee should be increased. Others
argue that although the fees are lower on public lands, the total costs to the 
rancher for public and private forage are actually on par, if such factors as 
the required transportation, labor and equipment are considered. This 
controversy is important to recognize, but will not be resolved in this work.
If the total costs to a ranching operation are less per animal for a ranch 
'  with a federal allotment, then there i s . clearly a benefit of having an
allotment. Even if the average total costs of public and private forage are
nearly equal, there are other benefits that are less obvious. Looking at the
microeconomics of ranching operations, a larger operation will usually have a
greater total income and a greater total profit. Often, through economies of
7 An AUM, or Animal Unit Month, defines either the amount of forage 
consumed by one cow, one cow and a calf, or six sheep in one month or the
length of stay of the same animals in a defined area. This term is usually used
in reference to leased areas, including federal grazing allotments.
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scale, larger operations also have more profit per unit of livestock, since, some 
costs remain nearly constant despite changes in the size of the ranch.
Although the degree of their influence is debated, in almost all cases 
allotments clearly provide some increase to. the yearly profit of a ranching 
o p e ra tio n .
Permits become valuable through the combination of . all these benefits, and 
that value becomes marketable because permits are consistently transferred 
with the sale of a ranch. Although definitions of permit value vary slightly, 
for this thesis permit value is defined as the difference between the real estate 
value of a ranch without its attached allotment(s) and the real estate value of a 
ranch with its allotment(s). The actual calculation of permit value for an 
allotment is complicated, since permit value fluctuates with many factors, 
including changes in grazing fee levels, possible changes to the AUM level of 
the allotment, the season of use for the allotment, the degree of security that 
the allotment will remain with the ranch, the ranch's geography and ecology, 
the general productivity of the ranch and allotment, and local trends in ranch 
real estate values.
WHY STUDY PERMIT VALUE?
Many environmentalists and lawmakers are not even aware that permit 
value exists. Others are aware of it but focus on the grazing fee controversy or 
ecological concerns. Some environmentalists that I talked to, influenced by 
their belief that permit value has no legal basis, blind themselves to the 
significance that permit value has for ranchers. They do this despite the fact 
that in some cases it more than doubles the base (deeded) value of a ranch. In 
either case, those who are aware of it have failed to educate the public oh its 
significance. Most ranchers with allotments are undoubtedly aware of the
economic importance of permit value, but for good reasons, few seem to make 
an issue of it. They choose instead to fight for the notion that grazing 
allotments are a property right, or emphasize the controversy over fee levels,
imploring politicians to keep them low in order to maintain the stability of the 
public lands ranchers. This tactic, however, gets little sympathy from those 
who see low fees as a subsidy. Those who believe in these subsidies often do not 
really care about the debate over total costs, or how it affect ranchers, for as 
taxpayers what they care about is that the costs of managing the federal 
allotment system is considerably more than the sum that grazing fees bring 
i n .
Ranchers might do better to be more open about the whole economic system 
of public land grazing. A clear explanation of permit value might gain or at 
least maintain public sympathy, especially if some ranchers have the courage
to admit that they have become stuck with a large investment in an allotment 
that is not very profitable, or has become more valuable for other public uses. 
These ranchers must be more flexible, and at least willing to listen to new 
politically broad-based land management options. Ranchers must recognize 
that the West is changing and in the long run, they cannot realistically hold
the acreage or AUMs that they currently do, in the face of the creeping forces
of increasing population, growing demands for recreation on public lands, 
and increasing recognition of wildlife habitat needs.
In return, environmentalists must face up to the historical and political
reality that it is unlikely that public lands ranching will end in the near 
future. They must work with the ranchers who are willing to change, and be 
willing to give some social and economic considerations to the long years of
investment and sentimental use that ranchers have in public lands. They can
continue in their attempt to chip away at the hardened allotment system
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through costly and time consuming appeals and legal battles, or they can try
to work towards finding real, long-term solutions. If they attempt the latter, 
understanding permit value will surely help.
The reality is that without a significant political or judicial shift, the 
struggle over public land ranching in the West will continue. That struggle 
can be painful and protracted, or may be transformed into a rational debate
that searches for equity and fairness. It is my hope that the exploration of 
permit value that follows, along with the concluding recommendations, will 
lead to some real attempts for more flexible and equitable grazing management 
systems, that both benefit the environment, and are fair to ranchers.
A PREVIEW OF WHAT FOLLOWS
This thesis looks closely at permit value in an attempt to redefine the 
century-long debate over public land grazing. It postulates that there is a 
marketable real estate value to public land grazing allotments (hitherto . 
referred to as permit value), that there is a fundamental tie between grazing
fees and permit value, that permit value is one of the two biggest reasons why
ranchers often resist cuts to their public land grazing allotments' AUM levels8
and other restrictive changes in . allotment management. It then finds that 1 
ultimately, the issue of permit value must be addressed before any serious 
attempt to resolve the conflicts over public land grazing will bring even 
partial closure to the debate over public land grazing.
Chapter Two traces the historical background of the development of permit 
value: How did it come into being? This history is by no means comprehensive, 
and only touches briefly on the already well documented extensive debate over
8 The other, primary reason is the stabilizing effect of the yearly economic 
benefits that a ranching operation incur by having a grazing allotment.
grazing allotment fee levels.^ Aside from fee levels, any law or event that
changes AUM levels would directly influence permit values, as would any law
or regulation that influences that existence or stability of permits. Thus, this
history focuses on the debates, political trends, and legal issues that have
influenced, or have the potential to influence, fee levels, AUM levels, or the
stability of the allotment system. These include factors such as new
environmental and land management laws along with related lawsuits, the
"Sagebrush Rebellion” and its roots, the more recent grazing bills introduced
\
by Senator Domenici and Representative Smith, fluctuations in the price of 
beef, and changes in land use patterns.
Chapter Three starts with a discussion of appraisal techniques and various 
theories proposed in the literature on the economic basis of permit value and 
the true costs of grazing on allotments. It then assembles the results of recent 
economic studies that assess the extent of permit value, i.e. how valuable is 
each additional AUM to the real estate value of a ranch. It also looks at the 
methods used in these studies to determine this value, including further 
discussion of the relationship between grazing fee levels and permit value. 
Finally, it attempts to explain some of the variations in those results.
Chapter Four reports the results of an informal survey the author conducted 
through interviews with forty-three people who are intimately concerned 
with the issue of public land grazing. These people include ranchers, both 
with and without federal allotments, federal land managers, professors, 
environmentalists, bankers, a Realtor and a reporter. The interviews were 
conducted in an attempt to assess the practical and political importance of 
permit value in the debate over public land grazing.
9 See Calif (57), Culhane (246-252), Foss Politics and Grass, Libecap (49, 81), and 
K ittredge.
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The focus of these interviews was on assessing the importance of permit 
value and on getting responses to new management options that would 
compensate ranchers for forces AUM reductions, or allow voluntary
retirement of allotments for compensation. The discussion of the results of 
these interviews also attempts to fit the interviewees' perspectives on permit 
value into a larger picture of the practical and philosophical views on public 
land grazing. It does this by comparing their perspectives on permit value 
with other related issues of importance, including ranch viability, grazing fee 
levels, retaining open spaces, land prices, maintaining viable wildlife habitat, 
maintaining rural communities, and the role of the federal government.
Chapter Five discusses various issues affecting public land grazing that need 
to be considered when examining new management tools. Then some new 
allotment management options are discussed that could potentially mitigate the 
economic impacts to the ranchers from AUM reductions and the resulting loss 
of permit value. The goal of some of these options is to reduce the resistance of 
the ranching community to AUM reductions that aim to increase critical
habitat for wildlife and improve stream and riparian function.
Many of these possibilities were discussed with the interviewees, to assess 
their political and practical viability. After a final assessment of the 
importance of permit value in the public land grazing debate, in Chapter Six a 
recommendation is made that includes an outline of the integral components 
of some new management options that might be successful if incorporated into 
new legislation.
CHAPTER 2 
A HISTORY OF PERMIT VALUE
-T- Grazing control on the National Forests was the most 
revolutionary force striking the western livestock
industry since its modern beginning. It cut abruptly 
across a manner of living, with all its freedoms, which 
had evolved during the frontier era.
Paul H. Roberts
A CONFLICT IN IDEOLOGIES
The debate over public land grazing is just a part of a conflict in ideologies
prevalent throughout the history of the West. Even before the Forest Service
first imposed regulatory control of grazing, there were philosophical, legal 
and even personal conflicts over public land grazing. Underlying the debate
over grazing was the question o f whether the land remaining in the public 
domain should be privatized. The creation of the forest reserves polarized 
these two camps, as it reversed the long-standing policy of privatizing the 
frontier, and was opposed by many in the West.
In regards to grazing, two basic philosophies emerged. The first is kin to the
"use it or lose it" philosophy of western water rights and the "first in time,
first in rights" philosophy of western miners. The second philosophy espoused 
the conservationist belief that public land should be used for the benefit of the 
public as a whole, and thus the use of forage through the grazing permit and 
lease systems are only a temporary privilege that can be revoked at any time.
These two philosophies have manifested in legal conflicts over numerous 
different issues regarding public land grazing, including the issue of permit 
value. Looking to understand why litigation over grazing is so common,
Michael Borman and Douglas Johnson note Judge Burns' remarks in the
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decision on the famous NRDC v. Hodel case that require NEPA assessments of 
BLM allotments:
He noted, however, that the reason for the large scale judicial intrusion 
into these areas has been the inability or unwillingness of the other 
branches, both state and federal, to provide solutions to significant
societal, environmental, and economic problems. We expect that 
litigation will continue and these legal "masters" will shape land use
policies in the future.
Considering that many important issues are still in court, I suspect this legal
"shaping" will continue. These include environmental efforts such as
Secretary of Interior Babbitt's RR '94 measures and initiatives from
environmental groups to lease state allotments. On the side of ranchers, Wayne
Hage, author of Storm Over Rangelands: Private Rights in Federal Lands,
continues to promote their cause in his case over water and grazing rights.
Also, if the courts continue to redefine "takings," a new definition may have
an influence of the legal status of permit value, although as of yet the courts
have continued to deny its legal existence.
It is not in the scope of this work to pass judgment on either these
philosophies or their legal or judicial implications. They are presented only to
provide background and depth to the attitudes and ideas of the people centrally
involved in the issues that are explored in later chapters. It is in their eyes
and minds that the value and influence of grazing permits becomes a powerful
economic, political and ecological force.
EARLY CONFLICTS OVER GRAZING REGULATION
During the nineteenth century, the users of public land forage found vast
unused open spaces that they grew accustom to using at no cost. They
gradually came to believe that this use was a right. Even after permit systems 
were instituted, first in the forest reserves (that later became the National 
Forests) and then on the lands that ended up being controlled by the BLM,
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instead of feeling they had a right to the open range, ranchers developed an 
expectation that their permits would continue intact. They transferred their
belief in a "right to graze" on the open range into a belief they had a right to 
their grazing permits.
In 1891, when the forest reserve were first created, the status of grazing in 
the reserves was not made clear, but quickly became an issue that unified 
western livestock interests. Meanwhile, under the leadership of John Muir, 
the influence of those opposing grazing grew. It is now largely forgotten that 
in 1894, three years after the reserves were first established, all grazing was 
officially excluded from the reserves. This proclamation, however, was
extensively ignored, largely because there was no enforcement mechanism.
Years of studies, debate, and lobbying ensued. Grazing was partially 
reinstated in 1897, by the Pettygrove Amendment to an appropriations bill, 
despite the recommendation of the Forest Committee that had been formed at 
the request of Secretary of the Interior Hoke Smith. The Department of the 
Interior stopped sheep grazing on the reserves again in 1899, after just one
year of regulation. Regulation was seen as a failure, but sheep grazing was 
reinstated that autumn after extensive political pressure from Northwestern 
Congressmen (Rowley 4-30).
This debate over grazing on the reserves even led to a split in the supporters 
of the forest reserves, after conservationists Gifford Pinchot and Albert Potter 
advocated a system o f regulated grazing in the reserves, much to the dismay of 
preservationist John Muir, who advocated an end to all grazing, at least of 
sheep, on the reserves. Since that time, it has largely been the 
preservationists' influence that has continued to advocate reductions in 
grazing levels. Indeed they have had some success, particularly in clearly
overgrazed areas, where their efforts are occasionally joined by the
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conservationists. Elements of. both the conservationist and preservationist 
traditions remain in the modern environmental movement, although the lines 
are not always clear. The preservationists, however, stimulated by expanding 
population and increased recreation use throughout the West, have in many 
ways become more persistent, and thus become more threatening to ranchers, 
especially ranchers who feel most strongly that they have a right to continue 
using their grazing allotments.
Confusion over the final status of grazing on the reserves continued to 
ensue until the regulation of the forest reserves was transferred to the 
Department of Agriculture in 1905. Between 1905 and 1906 the regulations 
were extensively revised. A three tiered preference system for permits was put 
in place • and fees were recommended for the 1906 season. Preference was 
given first to ranchers who owned land adjacent to the reserves, next to those 
who owned land near the reserves, and finally to transient herders with no 
local property (Rowley 53-59).* ®
This system was challenged in court, by those who questioned whether the 
agencies had a right to enforce regulations that were not specifically adopted 
by Congress. In 1911, the same year that the reserves were renamed National 
Forests, the Supreme Court decided two precedent-setting cases, United States v. 
G rim aud  and Light v. United Stares. Both affirmed that the Secretary of 
Agriculture did have the constitutional power to regulate the use of public 
lands for grazing, with the G rim aud  case making it clear that the agency also 
had the power to institute grazing fees.
1 6 For an extensive history of the debate over grazing in the forest reserves 
and the National Forests, see Rowley's U.S. Forest Service Grazing and 
Rangelands: A History. Texas A&M, 1985.
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The Ligh t  case is of special interest since it pits state versus federal rights. 
Fred Light thought that it was the government's duty to follow Colorado law, 
which puts the onus on landowners to exclude cattle from their property. Thus 
he believed it was the duty of the Forest Service to put up a fence to keep his 
cattle from wandering into the forest that bordered the open range near his 
land. The Supreme Court ruled that the United States did not have to follow 
Colorado law, and that Light was required to get a permit if his cattle were
grazing on public land. Thus, he was not free to knowingly allow his cattle to
wander into the forest boundary.
Numerous other court cases, including the Supreme Court decision 
Omaechevarria v. Idaho in 1918, have found that grazing on public land is not 
a vested right, even if a permit has been acquired and held for years. The 
issue, however, is not completely, clear. In 1890, an earlier Supreme Court 
decision, Buford v. Houtz, seemed to have ruled that ranchers had an implied 
license to graze public land. As Wayne Hage summarizes the case, "Mr. Houtz 
argued that the government of the United States had known of this use, had 
never forbidden it, nor taken any steps to arrest it, but had consented to and 
encouraged it." While that is all true, it is important to note that the 
government's "consent" was passive an d . really only applied to lands
unoccupied and not designated for other purposes.
THE ORIGINS OF PERMIT VALUE
Historically, access to the open range had value to ranchers, but permit 
value as presented here could not have existed before the Forest Service began 
instituting the permit system. Before that time stockmen could freely graze on
all public lands. With the new allotment system, notwithstanding any court 
decisions, ranchers quickly recognized that grazing permits legitimized the
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value of the open, range, and a kind of black market developed to buy and sell 
th em .
The earliest actual documentation of the existence of permit value that I 
have found in an extensive search of academic literature, is in a little known 
work written in 1913 by Will C. Barnes, "Western Grazing Grounds and Forest 
R anges."'H e notes how the early permit system in the forest reserves gave 
great preference to ranchers and settlers who had established land ownership 
near them, and that this preference virtually eliminated the migrant or 
"tramp" stockman. Barnes' description of these preferences in the early 
permit system also shows how they vary from the now familiar ten year 
inheritable leases. Most of the permits were yearlong, renewed in the spring,
and were not supposed to be salable and transferable—even to heirs.
Although Barnes states, "The object of these regulations is to prevent 
speculation in permits and the handing down of grazing privileges from one
person to another without the power of the Government [sic] to control it," 
(219) he also explains the obvious loopholes in that system. If both the stock 
and "such necessary ranch property as is clearly commensurate with' the
number of stock involved" were sold as a unit, then the permit could be 
renewed to the purchaser—and presumably it usually was. He cites cases 
"where sheep grazing under permit on a Forest [sic] have been sold for as 
much as $2 per head more than the market value, solely because the ranch 
which went with the purchase controlled the range in National Forest" (218).
That $2 per head is the permit value, but what is not clear from this single
source is how often these combined stock and land purchases occurred, or 
what the average permit value was in that era.
The central question from this early scenario remains with us even today:
"Why are ranchers willing to pay more for ranches with grazing permits?"
Figure 1: Leases listed in classified ads for early grazing
a llo tm en ts .
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Ranch for
Safe
160-acre ranch, 5 miles 
from railroad station. 
Joins forest reserve and 
good range. 75 acres in 
timothy and alfalfa. Fair 
buildings. Ideal small 
stock or dairy ranch.
Price $4500—Terms 
Collins Realty Go.
Helena, Mont.
TSX FINEST RANCH Is th e  w o t  tor  you 
tnutsee* men and former* who have St 
so d  wont s  place to  c ls r .  Zfcer sn d  13-th. 
trou t an the piece. Elk. bear end m oun tsln  
lakes w ithin saddle h o n e  distance. T h e  
location Is perfect. M mile* tram  W est 
Yellowstone. Very little  wind or snow. 
OU road, schools snd  railroad  within a  mile. 
Yoar tamUr will like I t  hare, Four-bedroom  
house, new In 1M& complete w ith lawn, 
trees, flowers and ahraba. X re rr  conveni- 
once. bath, electricity an d  furnace. T h is 
plsee Is suited for fine horses o r cattle. MO 
acre* and 130 head forest perm it. 130 acres 
under the  ditch In alfalfa  and tim othy a n d  
closer hay. Running stream  th roaah  e a r .  
rals. lota of tree Irrigation w ater. Dttrlm s. 
fences, c o rra ls ' and buildInss a re  In  A*1 
shape. One owner has spent 3S years In*. 
proTinc u n s  place and  I t 's  tha  show Placa 
of the d istrict. The price u  123.300. B a rry  
Y. Corning, (3* Cook a r e .  Bflltngi. M eat.
Montana Farmer Stockman 
10/15/46, p.36
3.3SS ACHX8 deeded land; M0 a e r a  T a t lo r  
land, 130 seres s ta te  land, 1 artesian  wells, 
3 windmill wells. •  dams, lire  creek n u t .  
n ine through reach , fenced an d  ow es  
fenced, mostly wo ren  wire. 100 acres o k  
falls, M. acres under eaM rutfon. TO acre* 
crested wheat. On m all route, on* m ile 
from  eehooL About f to  tana  o f  hay. Prfoe 
t1 .H  per acre  Including hay, o r  IS p e r  
acre including h a r , horses, m achinery, 
haase-hold goods, ete. Improvements fas. 
excellent shape, w ater fas house (good. well). 
Immediate possession. 30 percent down, b o k  
once In sm all annual paym ents. 10U bend 
cattle possibly to r lease. Melvin K . H orton, 
R anch Creek. H ont.
Montana Farmer Stockman
J 7/15/47 , p.36
Helena Independant 11 /9 /19 , p7
ran RANCH. 713 acres deeded land . 3M acres 
eultlvatad. S3 acres of sum m er faliowln* | 
en d  hay  goes; about 60 tons of tim othy a n a  ; 
olover. Price 630,000. Term s can  be had . ; 
H elson-M rera Agency, B os <13, U ringstssh  ! 
. M ontana. 1
Montana Farmer Stockman
10/15 /46 , p.36
For Sale—Ranch 
$60,000
A - l  R E L J . V q t n S H S f E . V T  tor s o le  In  w ell 
n e t t le d  c o u n t r y .  G o o d  w a te r .  S ix  m ile s  
f ro m  t im b e r .  1 m ile  f ro m  re s e rv e .  A d ­
d re s s ,  B o x  174 T r ib u n e .
Great Falls Tribune 
2 /8 /2 0 , p l5
t.ciRi.A(‘its: m ,r *iwkftstrnl fp s e i t f ,  J litlK frh  l*'1 . Ii*»»
p ric e * . m y  I f f f l i *  I I  »•»••• k  -
Great Falls Tribune 
11/12/16 , p9
- S ri A * ' | ; K S  tl*’«--lftl  h mil***
W i l l i  M a t * -  ? • • . !*• • •  I h ' l  . » * r * v  T a i t f *
«*r r ! ' y  j»r«*j»**riy par* p a y m e n t .  |:.i* 
M u  T r i l » ' i n i ‘. '  i
Great Falls Tribune 
2 /8 /2 0 , p i5
lj 4.100 A a c re s  o f  D e e d e d  (and, 
j 700 A cres  o f  S c r ip  land
30.000 A c re s  o f  L e a se d  land  svitli u n l im i te d  u n o c c u p ie d  ra r fg e  a d ­
jo in ing .
i 400 a c r e s  a r u ^ u u d c r  d i tch  w h ich  c a n  he  g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d  by  
b u i ld in g  a  dam .
T h e r e  a r c  30 mile* <>i fences  buil t  an d  in go o d  c o n d i t io n .
✓
T h e r e  is an  U - r o o m  cut s to n e  m o d e rn  r e s id e n c e  t h a t  c o s t  over
315.000 t o  build  on  t h e . p r o p e r ty ,  w i th  g r a v i ty  w a te r  s y s t e m ,  hoi  
w a ic r  h e a t e d  am! acy tc lc i te  l ighted .
A n  e n c lo s e d  ro c k  fo u n d a t io n  s to c k  sh e d  3*0 by  60 fee t .
A r o c k  b a r n .  100 h v  50 feet .
A s t a b le  fo r  .10 h e a d  of  h o r . e s ,  w a g o n  sh e d s ,  b l a c k s m i t h  s h o p  
g r a n e r y ,  s t o r e h o u s e s ,  b im kho iises ,  tncss  h o u s e s  a n d  e v e r y t h i n !  
n e c e s s a ry  for  c o n d u c t in g  a h ig h -c la s s  u p - t o - d a t e  r a n c h .
T h e r e  i-  a f i v e - in i i l , b i tu m in o u s  coal  vein  o n  th e  p r o p e r t y ' f r o n  
w h ich  fuel  is m ined  for o p e r a t i n g  th e  ra n c h .  T h is  cu ttfd  Be d e  
ve loped  in to  a b ig  |.rs>dticing m ine  at  l i t t le  e xpense .
Helena Independant 10/31/15, p7
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Clearly, the security of having an inexpensive uncontested source of forage is
the primary element of that value. Despite the requirement to pay the small
fee that was associated with the permit, Barnes thought that stockmen with 
permits were much better off than either those who had to complete on the 
open range, or those who had to lease private ranges for fees averaging three 
times as high (220).
Notwithstanding a fairly extensive record of the early disputes over both the 
existence and levels of grazing fees that extends from the 1910s through to the 
present, the values of the permit itself was not extensively discussed. There is,
however, a significant set of clues that permits had some influence on ranch
market values well before the 1960s, when agricultural economists began to 
study permit value. These clues can be found in the advertisements and 
classified sections from old magazines and newspapers where ranches were 
marketed. (See Figure 1.)
It is not uncommon to find ranches advertised as "adjoining forest reserve," 
or "controlling fine range" or having a number of "government" or "Taylor" 
acres. The ranch advertisements sometimes simply added the word "deeded" 
after the figure for acreage, to make it clear that the whole ranch was in fact 
owned. Presumable this practice started because some sellers included various 
leased and permitted acreage in their advertised figure for the ranch's total 
acreage. Others were more honest, and clearly distinguished deeded acres from 
leased acres in their ads, but obviously they still wanted to inform the buyer 
that they were getting something of more value than the deeded land alone.
Since these ads usually contained little information about the ranches, and 
proper ranch assessment considers many factors, it is difficult to determine 
the influence that federally leased acreage had on the marketability of 
ranches, and impossible to determine their influence on the selling price. It is
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also unclear how often land designated only as "leased" referred actually to
land held through forest reserve or Forest Service permits, and later leases 
under the Taylor Grazing Act. What is clear is that having extra leased acreage 
must have given some advantage to the seller or these references would not 
have been included in the ads, and that these permits did have some real estate 
value well before the time that such value was investigated by economists.
PERM IT VALUE AND THE TAYLOR GRAZING ACT
The next clearly documented indication of the existence and development of 
permit value came in passage of the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) of 1934. The TGA
expanded federal management of grazing into over 100 million acres of
previously open range, creating an allotment system that had many 
similarities to the Forest Service's. But in contrast with the primary uses of
timber and water in the National Forests, the TGA made grazing the primary 
use of these public lands. The TGA called for managing these lands in the form 
of grazing allotments. These allotments were connected to private holdings
through the establishment of ten year renewable leases that were both
inheritable and transferred with the sale of the land (pending the approval of 
the Grazing Service and its successor the BLM).
It is generally accepted that the TGA was passed to mitigate overgrazing on
federal lands and to reduce conflicts among the users of those lands. It may be, 
however, that its passage was made easier by the awareness of ranchers who 
understood the value of Forest Service permits. They knew that a permit or 
leasing system would give them not only more secure forage, but adso some 
advantage and possibly extra value in the marketplace if they were ever to sell 
their ranch.
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One important, and often overlooked passage in the TGA also insures the 
rancher that that extra value could be recognized by the banking system as 
co lla te ra l:
Except that no permittee complying with the rules and regulations laid 
down by the Secretary of the Interior shall be denied the renewal of 
such permit, if such denial will impair the value of the grazing unit of- 
the permittee, when such unit is pledged as security for any bona fide 
loan. (43 USCA §315b.)
Although it does seem rational to suppose that the ranchers' expectation of
gaining and retaining their allotment collateral and permit Value could have
been a reason in the passage of the extensively debated TGA, the extent of that
influence remains undocumented and unanswered here.
THE 1938 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
Considering the Clear advantage and recognition of permits as collateral
that the TGA provides in section 43 USCA §315b, the signing of the 1938
Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Governor of the Farm Credit Administration (FCA) comes as no surprise. The
events that led to this memorandum were covered in the legislative report o f
the American Cattle Producer as early as March. 1935, in a discussion of a
meeting regarding grazing permits:
The forests officials are conferring with officials for the Farm Credit 
Administration, as well as Director of Grazing F. R. Carpenter, and it is 
believed that a way will be found to work out the entire matter of 
grazing regulations, so that there will be sufficient stability in the 
operation to facilitate the making of federal bank loans on ranch 
la n d s .1 1
Presumably that meeting led to the subsequent signing of the 1938 
memorandum that focuses on the issue of loan security.
"Joint Conference with Forest Service Officials." American Cattle Producer. 
16.(1935): 22.
The memorandum is clearer than the §315b of the TGA, and outlines a 
procedure whereby a permittee is allowed to put the preference for their 
grazing permits in escrow, using that escrow as loan collateral in all but name. 
Under the agreement, in the event of foreclosure on a mortgage with such an 
escrow, the Forest Service was required, "subject to its regulations and general 
administrative [to] recognize the loan agency as the logical successor to a 
preference." The loan agency could continue to graze the land until they sold 
it, and pass on the preference to whomever bought the ranch. The agreement 
also required that for permits in these escrow arrangements, the loan agency 
be consulted in the event the Forest Service was going to reduce or discontinue 
the permit, and that at least a year's warning be given before the reduction 
was to take place.
The substance of the memorandum seems to be at least in part derived from 
the passage of the amended Federal Farm Loan Act. That Act calls for 
"reasonable assurance" of the continued use of the land when loads are made 
to livestock owners who rely upon public grazing. The Forest Service and BLM 
permit systems, along with the Memorandum of Agreement and Federal Farm 
Loan Act, were undoubtedly seen by most as working towards the development, 
prosperity and security of western agricu ltural'com m unities.12 Without the 
aid of the banks, many if not most of the ranches would not have been 
established in the first place, and certainly could not survive droughts or 
unforeseen downturns in stock prices. Over the years, however, this 
stabilizing effect has often worked to cement existing grazing levels in place,
12 Currently, when a lease legally ends up in the hands of an institution 
unqualified to renew it, the institution is given two years to transfer it (BLM 
Manual 4110-2-2&3) and the two years can be extended if complications arise.
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even i n . areas where ecological considerations call for reductions. in grazing 
levels.
The agreement continues even today, under a somewhat altered and clarified 
form (1986 Forest Service Handbook 18.32-2). This agreement, along with .the 
general practice of banks making loans to ranchers based on both the deeded 
and permit value of their ranches, has given rise to accusations by 
environmentalists that the banks have an economic interest in maintaining
t
the permit system and as a result use their political influence to maintain
permits at their existing l e v e l s . 1 3 ,
The existence of the memorandum and TGA's §315b clearly document that, by 
the 1930s, the value of permits was generally recognized to both the stockmen
and the banks, but it raises more questions about the nature of permit value 
than it answers. Was the value only in the form of stabilization of ranch units 
and thus their mortgages, or did it take on real estate value as well, and if so 
how much? How extensive was the practice of taking permits as collateral 
before the legal provisions came into effect? After these provisions? While it 
would take a major investigation beyond the scope of this work to discover the 
historical or present extent of permit value's use as collateral, it is generally 
recognized as widespread ("Taxpayers taken for ride by Western ranchers"),
even through the admission of FCA officers (Henson).
13 In the well known case of the disputed Diamond Bar allotment in New 
Mexico's Gila National Forest, the environmental group Gila Watch found at 
least six separate appeals from banks attempting to dissuade the Forest 
Service from reducing the permit's AUM level. During part of the 
controversy, the official permit level was held constant while the actual use
was temporarily reduced.
During my interviews, I was discretely told by one of the land managers 
(who preferred to remain anonymous) of other allotments where the 
permitted use level was held constant despite an actual reduction in the field. 
These "temporary" reductions are apparently done to avoid conflicts with the 
ranchers and the banks. The impression given was that this practice was not 
uncommon, especially in cases of significant reductions.
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THE ERA OF GRAZING COUNCILS
If the stability of permit levels is a factor in permit value, so is the 
likelihood of their renewal. In looking though the history of the management 
of the permit system, it is rare that permits are not renewed to active ranchers 
who continued to desire them.14 With this in mind, the most significant 
change brought about by the TGA is clearly the development of the Grazing 
Advisory Boards, which strongly influenced the lifestyle and values of 
ranchers with TGA allotments.
In the first few years after the implementation of the TGA in 1934 most of 
the grazing lands were divided into Grazing Districts. Each of the districts had 
a Grazing Advisory Board that arbitrated disputes between ranchers and made 
recommendations to the federal administrators as to grazing levels and permit 
renewals. Each board consisted of nine positions. Four positions represented 
cattlemen and horsemen and four positions represented sheepmen and 
goatsmen elected by ranchers from within each grazing district. The state 
appointed one position to represent wildlife interests.
Each district also had a district range manager who, at least on paper, was:
responsible for the protection and development of all the surface 
resources in his district. Probably the major functions carried on in a 
grazing district are grazing management, range conservation, range 
improvements, forestry management, fire control, and wildlife 
management. Once the boundaries of a district have been set, it is the 
district range manager's duty to ascertain the carrying capacity of the 
range. (Foss 99)
This is no small job, considering that many of the districts are larger than 
C onnecticu t.
14 The difficulty Hispanic ranchers in Northern New Mexico had in renewing 
their permits is a noted exception. See William Eno DeBuys' Enchantment and 
Exploitation. Albuquerque, NM: University of NM, 1985.
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With range managers spread so thin, it is easy to see how the day-to-day 
decisions of such regulators could be ignored or influenced by groups of 
ranchers, whose elected grazing advisory boards had officially recognized 
power to make recommendations. The ranchers were well organized to 
exercise political power. They had local, state, and national stockmen's 
associations, and the support of many western senators, some of whom were 
themselves ranchers. In Politics and. Grass, Foss even argues that this power, 
combined with the Grazing Service's and later the BLM's lack of personnel in 
these rural isolated areas, led to a system whereby the advisory boards made 
over ninety percent of the management decisions in many districts.
State and national advisory boards were also instituted, and not only were 
they effective in making most of the decisions, keeping administrators few 
and powerless, and fees low, they increased in political savvy enough to 
understand the importance of keeping the fee controversy and the 
significance of permit value largely out of the public's attention. Congressman 
Taylor called this influence, "Home rule on the range."
Two stories from the author William Kittredge, who grew up in southeastern
Oregon, reveal the irreverence that that power commanded:
We mostly regarded the BLM range management experts as impractical 
college boys, and tried to ignore them when they asked us to change our 
grazing practices. "You got to keep the cattle out of that Hill Camp j
 country for a couple of years," they would say, arid we would say, "Surer"
and smile, and then do as we damned pleased.
The story portrays the ranchers' general sentiment towards government
officials as similar to a horse's feelings towards its pesky flies: they are in
constant need of being whisked away by the brush of their tail. At times, the
interactions between ranchers and officials became more belligerent:
Around 1960—this may be an apocryphal story, point is we believed it 
and loved it—a man from the BLM walked out into a hayfield to give some 
old rancher an earful about running too many cattle on his allotment. 
The rancher took after him with a gun. The chase led through the fields
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until the fellow from the BLM climbed up in a stack of loose meadow hay 
and hid. The old rancher lit the haystack afire. "Cooked that 
sonofabitch," the old rancher would say, at least according to the way I 
heard the story. It was clearly us against them. They were trying to tell 
us how to take care of our country, which we loved even as we caused 
some damage now and then, and we hated them for their trouble.
The ranchers' attitude in these stories is not simply, "This is my allotment."
It is clear that often their attitude is more aptly phrased, "This is my land!" and 
is rooted in many factors. Once again, it is important to remember that for the 
old-time ranch families, the range was once grazed for free. Further, 
throughout its development, the system whereby ranchers could lease 
otherwise unused public land has been clearly and strongly coded into legal 
system. Ranchers are the ones who have used and "improved" the land with 
fences and watering systems. Within grazing districts, through the advisory 
boards, they have had a strong say in local decision making. For a few 
ranches, there is a sixty-to-ninety year history of leases held by a single 
family. Finally, since most of the ecological and landscape transformations 
resulting from grazing occurred years ago, most ranchers are not lying if 
they say, "For as long as I can remember, the land always looked this way." 
Although new environmental laws and the growth of the BLM, in both budget 
and personnel, h av e . slowly brought both management changes and new 
perspectives, it could be argued that the influence of the "Home rule on the 
range" philosophy continues even today.
MORE LEGAL CONFLICTS
Many of the recent arguments that explicitly propose grazing on public 
land to be a legal right are derived from or refer back to the decision in R e d  
Canyon Sheep Company v Ickes, 98 FR 2d 308, (1938). This complicated case 
heard by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia put an injunction 
on a land trade proposed by Mr. C. M. Harvey, who owned land completely
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enclosed by National Forest, and wanted to trade his land for some land 
controlled by the Department of Interior. The Interior's land, however, had 
already been put into a grazing district as authorized by Section 7 of the TGA, 
and had, "by an Executive Order of November 26, 1934, No 6910, [been] 
withdrawn from settlement, location, sale or entry" (98 FR 2d 311), pending 
further classification .
Further, a temporary license to graze had already been given to the Red 
Canyon Sheep Co., which argued that it would suffer a substantial loss if the 
trade proceeded, as they fully expected the license to eventually become a 
permit. The court agreed and stopped the transfer, apparently admitting that 
the Red Canyon Sheep Co. had a right to graze. What is often forgotten is that
the court also asserted that the Secretary of the Interior still had the power to
reclassify that land and take it out of the grazing district at any time so that he
could then proceed with the transfer if he so chose.
The court's allowance that the Secretary has such power implied that the 
company had no property right in regards to the grazing federal land, and is 
thus consistent with the decisions in the Grimaud, Light, and Omaechevarria
cases. Still, in a few places in this decision, the courts used other language that 
can be read to substantiate "grazing rights." First, in their examination of the 
phrase from Part I, §3 of the TGA, "stock owners as under his rules and 
regulations are entitled to participate in the use of the range," the decision
states:
But we .do conclude that if the Secretary determines to set up a grazing 
district including lands upon which grazing has been going on, then 
those who have been grazing their livestock upon these lands and who
bring themselves within a preferred class set up by the statute and
regulations, are entitled as of right to permits as against others who do 
not possess the same facilities fdr economic and beneficial use of the 
range. (98 FR 2d 314)
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The courts use of the words "entitled" and "right" resound for those who would 
like public land grazing to be an absolute property right, even if the decision 
only actually clarifies the decision-making process that chooses which 
ranchers are to get permits.
Further, although this decision agrees with other courts that grazing is not
a vested right, it also states that:
Yet, whether they be called rights, privileges, or bare licenses, or by 
whatever name, while they exist they are something of real value to the 
possessors and something which have their source in an enactment of 
the Congress. (98 FR 2d 315)
In such a statement, grazing rights activists see the courts affirming permit
value. On the other hand, most environmentalists are either unaware of such
statements, or chose to downplay or ignore them. Although they are correct in
continually calling allotments public land, simply calling them such does not
take away the privileges to their use that Congress gave to ranchers. The
question then becomes, "To what extent is that privilege itself something
su b stan tia l? "
Two other controversial cases have important relevance to the question of 
permit value. Both United States v. Jaramillo, and later United States v. Fuller, 
deal with circumstances where the government took away private lands 
through eminent domain, but left the grazing permits intact. In both cases the 
question was not whether the landowner should be awarded money for the 
allotment (which the courts have refused to do even if permits are canceled), 
but whether a jury should take into consideration the potentially increased 
value that ^private land has due to the proximity of the allotment lands and 
their economic importance to the landowner.
The judge in the Jaramillo case allowed the jury to consider the influence of 
the allotment on the real estate value, but in a five to four decision on the 
Fuller case the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the district and appeals
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courts, which had also allowed the jury to consider the importance of the 
permit, arguing that the government was not required to pay compensation 
for a value that the government had created (i.e. permit value). In this case 
the government ended up paying $136,500, when Fuller's expert witnesses had 
valued the land at upwards of a million dollars, and the original jury was going 
to compromise, awarding Fuller $350,000.
The other major legal quandary that has solidified the value of grazing 
permits in the minds of many involves the practices of the IRS. Although I 
have not been able to find a clear starting point for this practice, for many
years the IRS has figured inheritance tax on the total value of a ranching
estate, including the assessed value attributed to its grazing allotments. Thus, 
although originally a permit may have been awarded to some lucky rancher, 
the rancher's heirs are required to pay for 50% of the allotment's value. Even 
though this law only applies to the value of an estate that exceeds a certain 
limit, all but the smallest ranches have at least part of their value taxed. The
sentiment among many ranchers is that if the IRS recognizes the value of
permits, than the Forest Service and BLM should also.
GROWING ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES
The seeds of many of the present disputes over public land grazing were 
planted in the 1960s, with the passage of the Wilderness Act (1964), the ' 
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA-1964), the National Historic 
Preservation Act (1966) and Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (1968). Each, to 
varying degrees, brought changes in grazing policy. Then, a whole new set of 
laws passed during the environmental movement of the seventies opened the 
door to many more changes, with the passage of the National Environmental 
Protection Act (NEPA-1970), the Endangered Species Act (ESA-1973), the Clean
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Water Act (CWA-1972), the National Forest Management Act (NFMA-1976), the 
Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA-1976, also known as the 
BLM Organic Act) and the Public Rangeland Improvement Act (PRIA-1978).
The most significant event in this era was undoubtedly the 1974 landmark 
decision in the Natural Resource Defense Council's suit (NRDC v. Morton), 
which used NEPA to require that the BLM do Environmental Impact Statements 
on its rangelands before reissuing leases. The suit forced the BLM to conduct
144 site specific Environmental Assessments (EAs) and Environmental Impact
: Statements (EISs) to analyze the effects of grazing, thus allowing public
comments to be made for each individual allotment. Many of these assessments 
initially called for significant reductions in grazing, but these reductions 
were lessened through appeals and political pressure. Even still, since that 
decision, NEPA has probably been the strongest and most widely used tool for 
environmentalists to force changes in allotment management, particularly in 
obviously impacted areas.
■ NEPA, along with the strong language in MUSYA, FLPMA, and the PRIA, gave 
environmentalists the ability to force the recognition of recreation, scenic, 
and habitat values, to make changes in agency monitoring and management 
techniques, and even to alter individual allotment plans. Still,
environmentalists have only made significant changes in areas where they 
could keep their attention and efforts focused. Charles Wilkinson offers an 
explanation as to why overall environmentalists efforts have only been 
m arginally successful:
The public interest groups...can gear up reasonably well for a 
sweeping legislative initiative such as the enactment of FLPMA, but 
they almost entirely lack the ability to influence the thousands of 
significant policy decisions made every year in the BLM and Forest
Service field offices.... These include what are in a sense the most 
important decisions of all: to allow by default this grazing. allotment, 
that grazing allotment...to go ahead for yet another year under what 
amounts to no management. For the cattle industry, administrative 
lobbying at that level is literally part of the cost of doing business. ( I l l )
Some local environmental groups have taken his words to heart. The Oregon
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Natural Resources Council recently developed a model citizen monitoring
system in which volunteers are trained to monitor and comment on grazing .
allotments, and are asked to visit allotments three times a year. Other groups
are following suit, and various new guides to monitoring grazing allotments,
including the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance's publication, How Not to be
Cowed, are also being developed. These give citizens quick access to much of
the information and the tools they need to comment on the allotments where
they hike, hunt, or fish.
Each of these new laws and efforts has brought gradual change to public
land grazing practices. The Wilderness Act and Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
both directly threaten permit value, but only for a small portion of the
allotment system. Although the implementation of these laws usually leave
allotments within designated, areas intact for the current, users, designation
usually includes a provision that ends the leasing of allotments when the land
is sold. This eliminates the permit value of these allotments. Under MUSYA and
FLPMA, areas that were once consider largely or primarily devoted to grazing
use are now forced to compete with other uses. Sometimes these other uses
conflict with grazing, leading to a decline in AUM levels. With the ESA and
National Historic Preservation Act, ranchers now fear that evidence of
artifacts or endangered species on their allotments will limit or end grazing.
Overall these new laws, whose affects generally get incorporated into the
NEPA process, have still brought only gradual changes in total AUM levels
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allowed by the BLM and Forest Service. Nevertheless, a number of allotments
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have been hit hard by NEPA assessments or occasional lawsuits that call for 
significant reductions in AUM levels or an end to grazing altogether.
These reductions, whether proposed or implemented, spark ire and 
resistance from the public lands ranchers, who clearly fear further 
reductions in their overall profits and to permit value. Even the ranchers who 
are not facing immediate reductions fear that they may have to face 
threatened or actual reductions in the future. The question remains, however, 
as to how much overall influence these new environmental laws have on 
permit value. While reducing an allotment's AUM level will clearly reduce its 
permit value, managers often make these reductions temporary, or reduce the 
'"actual use" of an allotment while, keeping the official "permitted use" on the 
books stable.15 This allows them to keep their real estate value and value as 
collateral. Many ranchers and agricultural economists argue that the new 
environmental laws reduce the value of each AUM value, but do market trends 
really reflect this conception? It may be that the perceived threat of AUM 
reductions and the associated increased risk of investing in permit value have 
developed enough of a psychological influence that they have achieved the 
status of actual market forces.
THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION
For many ranchers, along with groups of loggers, millworkers, miners, and 
others whose jobs were tied to the public land, and to a more vocal' and visible 
group of conservative thinkers and politicians, this new era of environmental 
laws caused a wave of fear, distaste, and anger, which led in part to their
15 I discovered this through the interview process, and confirmed it with 
ranchers and land managers, who preferred to remain anonymous on this 
p o in t.
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organizing around a powerful new formulation of their historically rooted 
sentiments. The call of the Sagebrush Rebellion, with its aim of bringing the 
federal domain into state control, and of its offshoot, which called for 
privatization of federal land, caused a response in them that could not have 
been more clear. For many it was the desire to solidify what they felt they 
already had, but were at risk of losing: the control of the land. For the 
ranchers, if the rangelands were held by the state or privately, they would 
have more influence over decisions affecting them, and little or no risk of 
losing the economic value of the allotment leases they had long held and 
continue to feel invested in, with both their money and labor.
The Sagebrush Rebellion has its roots in the dissension of the western 
.stockmen that started early in the century. Rowley recounts how the stockmen
at the Public Lands Convention held in Denver in 1907, upset over grazing 
regulations and fees, "talked in terms of western secession" (65). Similar
disputes, 'term ed the "blowup in Region 2" erupted in the late 1940s in Colorado.
The ensuing political battle that aimed to further ranchers' rights to graze on
public lands has continued, often unifying the ranchers' anti-agency 
sentiment (207-217).
The modern Sagebrush Rebellion began in 1979 when the Nevada legislature 
passed a bill-claiming ownership of all 48 million acres of BLM land in the 
state. Within the next two years, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming 
passed similar legislation, while Hawaii and South Dakota passed resolutions 
supporting the cause. Meanwhile the rebels' proposals were argued but 
defeated in seven other states (Cawley, 2). Secretary of Interior James Watt 
even took steps, ultimately unsuccessful, to sell off large portions of public 
land .
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The courts overruled these measures and few actual policy changes resulted
from the movement. As Cawley suggests:
the Sagebrush Rebellion represented a protest against the 
environmental movement. The measure of environmental influence, in 
turn, was the proliferation of regulations.... The question confronting 
the Sagebrush Rebels, therefore, was how to curtail the environmental 
community's influence and thereby stem the tide of regulations. (161)
Viewed in that light, the rebels won most of the battles over grazing in the
1980s, by preventing the passing of many new environmental laws, and
generally maintaining low fee and stable AUM levels.
With Reagan's election and the prospect of looser regulations and
enforcement, much of the momentum of the movement stalled. The ranchers
had their man in the White House and did not need to rebel. But the war was
not over. It took Bush's declaration of his environmentalism to rekindle the
movement and mend some of the splits between different rebel factions:
Representatives from many of the interests that had populated the 
Sagebrush Rebellion convened in Reno, Nevada, in August 1988 to 
attend a Multiple Use Strategy Conference. This conference marked the 
beginning of the Wise Use Movement. (Cawley 164)
As it turned out, they had little to worry about, since in practical terms Bush's
administration of the public domain was much like Reagan's. Nevertheless, the
movement continued. For many ranchers the philosophic and economic
principles voiced by the Wise Use movement spoke of the concerns which had
underlain their long-standing controversy over grazing fees. The movement
collected the sentiments and ideas they lived by but had never completely or
coherently form ulated.
THE BABBITT REFORMS AND 1990s ENVIRONMENTALISM
The amazing grassroots and often bipartisan strength of the Wise Use 
movement arose yet again in 1993, when Clinton, through his Secretary of the 
Interior Bruce Babbitt, proposed new fee increases for federal allotments. The
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controversy again exploded, and this time not just on the range or in the back
rooms of Congress, but with national attention:
Western ranchers came streaming into Washington last week, string 
ties hoisted, hats as wide as the plains, boots gleaming. But they were 
jumpy and angry. And in the shadowy halls of the Capitol and the 
Interior and Agriculture Departments, they listened and argued about 
Bill Clinton's proposal to raise prices on government land and ' 
resources. (Sidey 39)
)
After this visit, and intense pressure from western senators, Clinton 
backpedaled and proposed compromise, but did not completely give up on the 
issue.
Babbitt held extensive meetings throughout the West over the next two years 
and found a number of common complaints and difficulties. He then came up 
with a new set of reforms that included among others, a more modest fee 
increase, some incentive measures for lessees who managed their lands well, 
establishment of Grazing Advisory Councils, allowing ranchers more leeway
■ 'J
in resting their allotments, and allowing nonranchers to lease allotments. 
While some of these proposals have been implemented, including the Grazing 
Advisory Councils, others, including the right-to-rest provision and allowing 
nonranching leaseholders, are still working their way though the court 
s y s t e m . Qn one hand the laws regarding allotment leases require  that 
allotments be grazed, but they also allow the lessee to temporarily halt grazing 
to improve allotment conditions. At issue is the question of how much 
discretion the BLM has in defining "temporary."
These last two issues have also hit the state courts in Oregon, Idaho, New 
Mexico and Arizona, after environmental groups started to outbid ranchers for
16 The Federal District Court of Wyoming overruled many of Babbitt’s proposed 
reforms, including the provision allowing extended resting of allotments 
termed "conservation use." For the decision, which is being appealed, see 
Public Lands Council v. - United States Department o f Interior, 929 F. Supp 1436 
(1996).
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the leases of state-controlled school grant lands, hoping to give these 
allotments an extended or permanent rest. Nevertheless, most of these leases 
were still awarded to the lower-bidding ranchers who had held them 
previously. Some of cases are headed to their respective state supreme courts, 
and may finally end up in the US Supreme Court.
Other recent developments in the 1990s have been forcing significant 
changes in grazing levels and practices which indirectly affect the question 
of permit value. In the Columbia River Basin, the declaration of various 
salmon and steelhead runs as threatened or endangered, followed by the 
publication of Pacfish ,  the draft EIS which discusses the implications of these 
listings, has already begun to force land managers to fence the riparian areas 
of affected streams to protect them from cattle grazing, for fear of lawsuits. 
.With the listing of the bull trout and expected listing of the westslope cutthroat 
trout, In fish  and the Interior Columbia Basin EIS could force similar measures 
throughout much of the Inland West. In the Southwest, after the listing of 
willow flycatcher and other species, other suits have successfully asked for 
grazing reductions in their habitat and more are expected to follow.
Finally, Judge Haggerty's 1996 decision in the Clean Water Act case, Oregon  
Natural Desert Association et al. v. Jack Ward Thomas, may become the latest 
bane to the public lands ranchers. The decision establishes, "that applicants 
for federal grazing permits receive, as a necessary precondition to the 
issuance of that permit, certification from the state in which the grazing is to 
occur that the grazing will not adversely impact state water quality standards" 
(4). This is extraordinary because the Clean Water Act has not been much of a 
fa c to r. in grazing disputes, even though as a nonpoint sediment pollution 
source, sedimentation from grazing affects thousands of miles of rivers and 
streams, as well as extensive wetlands throughout the West. According to Bill
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Marlett at Oregon Natural Desert Association, the "EPA has already supported 
401 applicability as a policy matter, and has been joined by the Association of 
State Attorneys General on the legal issues." If this certification process moves 
forward, it is likely to become a tool used by environmentalists to reduce AUMs, 
thus reducing the total permit value of allotments.
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE ENVIRONMENTALISTS’ SUCCESS
With the introduction of the bill, S. 852, To Provide fo r  Uniform Management 
o f Livestock Grazing on Federal Land, and Other Purposes, in 1995 by Senator 
Domenici of New Mexico, the ranching community began to respond to the 
environmentalists' success in the courts with a series of legislative responses. 
The goals still clearly include maintaining low fee levels, but due to low prices 
of beef in the 1990s, which in part determine those levels, environmentalists 
have not been successful in raising fees. The goals of the "Domenici Bill" and 
the other legislative proposals that followed are more focused on stopping the 
erosion of the total AUM levels, stopping the elimination of grazing from 
individual allotments, blocking the general public's ability to influence 
allotment management decisions, eliminating the recent reforms in BLM 
grazing management, and blocking the use of the ESA to modify grazing 
management. Overall, these bills can be seen as an attempt to give ranchers 
with public land, leases greater control over those lands than they have had 
since the passing of the Taylor Gazing Act in 1934.
The Domenici Bill provided for increasing the . duration of most leases from 
ten to fifteen years, and provided further isolation to the ranchers by limiting 
possible public comment on the BLM and Forest Service allotment management 
plans (AMPs) to that, of "affected interests." The bill then redefined an 
"affected interest," limiting it to a person or group who "has provided
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substantial evidence that the management of the public lands will affect that 
individual or organization" (§103). This definition, if passed into law, would 
have made it increasingly difficult for the general public to influence or 
appeal the AMPs that are written into the leases. (These plans sometimes ask 
for a decrease in AUMs to benefit the riparian areas, scenic values, and 
wildlife habitat within allotments.)
Domenici's bill drew enough attention that it provoked a coordinated and 
successful effort by environmental groups to prevented its passage. They were 
not fooled by the bill's attempt to obscure some of its major provisions, which 
repealed or amended sections of the Public Rangelands Improvement Act, by 
referring to them only by number, when in fact these sections contained the 
strongest environmental protection language in that Act.
But not everything was hidden. Besides the obvious increase of leases from 
ten to fifteen years, there were a few glaring sections that clearly showed that
this bill could generally threaten long-term rangeland productivity. Consider 
the new definition for livestock carrying capacity that opens the door to calls
for reassessing current allotment limits: "The term 'livestock carrying
capacity' 'means the maximum sustainable stocking rate that is • possible 
without inducing permanent damage to vegetation or related resources" 
(§104.23). It does not take much foresight to realize that any tests attempting to 
ascertain that carrying capacity would induce the permanent damage that
they were, in theory, aiming to prevent. Additionally, Jhe bill attempted to
make the issuing of permits or leases a federal action that would be outside the
consideration of NEPA (§121). On final analysis, the bill looks like an attempt to 
farther codify the, "This is my allotment!" attitude.
Although Domenici's bill failed, a little known rider was quietly slipped into 
the 1995 Rescissions Bill (PL 104-19 §504) along with the "Salvage Rider." It
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called for the Forestv Service to implement a schedule to ensure, "that not more 
than 20 percent of the allotments shall undergo NEPA analysis" each year. This 
might not seem very significant, but there was and continues to be a backlog 
of allotments due for renewal. Moreover, the bill also forces the Forest Service 
to renew the allotments which have their analyses delayed with their current 
terms and conditions, until the time they can be fully assessed. This allows 
overgrazed allotments, many of which still lack AMPs and are long overdue for 
assessment, to avoid analysis for up to ten more years—and maintain their 
existing permit value. Aside from . this drawback, theoretically a clear schedule 
of allotment assessments could bring some long-term benefits, because it 
might allow the Forest Service to designate sufficient personnel to work on 
them, and thus eventually allow for better quality AMPs, EAs and EISs.
In 1997, Representative Bob Smith introduced a slightly toned down version 
'Of Domenici's bill, "The Forage Improvement Act of 1997." It has got more 
support than the previous version, passing in the House on October 30, 1997 by 
a 242-182 vote.. Nevertheless, so far it failed to become law even after it was 
modified to offer at 30% increase in grazing fees (from $1.35 to $1.85 per AUM). 
This failure is undoubtedly in part due to the heightened awareness of major 
environmental groups to these issues that was brought by Domenici's bill.
Still, Domenici has not completely failed to gather support this session in his 
efforts to maintain the existing AUMs and permit value of federal allotments.
In the Interior Appropriations bill signed in November 1997, a rider was 
slipped in that effectively reversed a court decision that may have stopped 
grazing on over four hundred allotments due to concerns over endangered 
species.
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THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE
Clearly the struggle between ranchers and environmentalists runs deeper 
than a controversy over low grazing fees. This struggle encompasses the 
shape and continuance of the public land grazing system. Central to these 
issues is maintaining the value of permits and the economics and value of 
public lands ranching. While not all environmentalists called for, "Cattle free 
by '93,” most are concerned about the health of riparian areas, endemic 
ecosystems, and endangered species, and support significant reductions in 
AUM levels.
The counter-argument heard from ranchers is that many ranching 
operations would fold with higher fees or lower AUMs, and that they are 
defending their way of life. This argument does have some merit for 
operations running on marginal profits, with a high dependency on federal 
lands, or with high debts. In these cases, higher fees or lower AUMs 
significantly cut into profits and lower permit values. Lower permit values 
also reduce a ranch's collateral value, thus making it more difficult to 
refinance if hard times hit. With foreign or corporate owned ranches, 
however, or with larger family owned but more profitable and less federally 
dependent operations, the motivation of "protecting a way of life" must be 
questioned. Many operations would not go under even if they were stripped of 
federal lands or if fees were tripled. For them the motivations surely include 
both maintaining their permits' real estate value and the year-to-year profits 
that come with allotments.
From the historical record, it is impossible to determine just what 
motivations influenced specific political events in the history of public land 
grazing. Fee levels, AUM levels, permit values and profit are. simply too 
interwoven to separate when considering the motivations of policy decisions
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and legislative proposals, since most proposals or decisions have the potential 
to affect all of them. The real motivations for these efforts can really only be 
explained by the ranchers themselves, and will be further explored in Chapter 
Four, which discusses the results of interviewing ranchers and individuals 
whose work brings them in close contact with ranchers.
CHAPTER 3 
THE ECONOMICS OF PERMIT VALUE
This chapter returns to the question, "Why does permit value exist, and how 
can it be assessed?" The chapter starts by discussing different methods for 
ranch appraisal, then looks at the two theories as to why permit value exists. 
These theories, in turn lead into a discussion of the total true cost of public and
private leases. Next, various methods used to assess permit value will be
discussed, followed by a look at the results from key academic studies of permit
value, and the factors that could explain the variability of their results.
TYPES OF RANCH APPRAISAL
As discussed previously, in simplest terms, permit value is the additional real 
estate value of a ranch gained from having the privilege and use of a public 
land grazing allotment from either the Forest Service or BLM.17 Still, since
both the agencies and the judicial system have made it clear that these permits
are not owned, then where does that value come from?
Any understanding of permit values requires at least a cursory
understanding of ranch appraisal. Traditionally one of the simplest and easiest
(although not necessarily more accurate) ways to appraise a ranch is to base 
the value on the ranch's carrying capacity (American Institute of Real Estate
17 State and private leases can also have permit value, but they are not the 
focus of this study.
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Appraisers; Gee et al.; Oppenheimer), i.e., the sheer numbers of livestock that 
the forage and feed available to the operation can support. The other
traditional assessment method is based on estimating the expected income of 
the ranch, then using capitalization techniques to project the ranch
operation's expected worth and investment potential.
Both carrying capacity and expected income are still often used for a quick 
estimate of a ranch values, but appraisers and economists now routinely
consider and assign values to more than a dozen factors including the value
and upkeep of the buildings, the distance to the nearest town and railroad, 
scenic value, acreage in crops, water rights, the percentage of irrigated land,
operational costs, and the percentage of deeded forage compared to private 
leased forage, state leased forage, Forest Service leased forage and BLM leased 
forage. Operational costs are, in turn, broken down into numerous associated 
fac to rs .
This type of breakdown, when applied to a large set of unforced ranch 
sa le s ,1 & allows economists to do a type of regression analysis known as hedonic 
modeling. In a hedonic model, each factor that is expected to influence the 
price significantly is measured and assigned a unit value, then put into an 
equation with a variable coefficient. With a large enough set of data, these
variables can be solved. The solution gives the average influence that each
unit of a given factor has on the sale price. For example, each acre of irrigated 
rangeland may end up valued at $100 more than non-irrigated land, or each 
mile from a railroad station might reduce the value of the whole ranch by $50, 
i.e. reducing the value of a ranch 40 miles from a station by $2000.
*8 An unforced sale is a sale between a willing seller and willing buyer, with 
no influence from excessive debt, inability to continue ranching operations 
or other factors than could unusually inflate or reduce the price.
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TWO THEORIES ON THE SOURCE OF PERMIT VALUE
Up until the 1960s, there was little documentation of permit value. . Starting 
in the 1960s, a number Of agricultural economists began to study it, primarily 
because of its relationship to grazing fee levels. Until recently, these studies / 
generally agreed that the existence of permit value was a result of the 
economic benefits from public land leases grazing fees being set lower than
those paid in a competitive market setting. Lower fees result initially in a 
yearly operational savings to the rancher. This savings, in turn, becomes an 
expected part of the yearly operation of the ranch. Then, since allotment 
permits and leases traditionally get transferred with the sale of the ranch,
buyers and sellers began to see the expected savings associated with them as
an investment; however, the security of that investment required that 
allotment grazing fees remain lower than fees for private leases. To estimate, 
the worth of that investment, economists could then use traditional' appraisal 
and capitalization methods similar to those used on a variety o f investments.
Another theory, promoted by Iqbal and rooted in traditional ranch appraisal 
techniques, finds that there is often no significant cost savings from public 
allotments compared to private leases or private land. Instead, permit value is 
found to be the result of the benefits associated with the economy of scale that 
comes with holding allotments (or contracts for private leases). Simply put, 
larger ranches cost less to run per cow, because many overhead costs either
remain fixed or increase only marginally in a larger operation. These costs 
include such factors as maintaining a homestead and office, accounting costs,
purchasing and maintaining tools, and often fencing, herding and riding
costs.
Iqbal's theory is also closely related to those of scholars who claim that
permit value was simply the result of the initial assignment of allotments. The
ranchers who were awarded the first allotments were given what can be seen 
as a gift from the government. Between that original assignment and the late 
1960s, over 85% of allotments had been sold to new owners (Nielson and 
Workman). The percentage of these leases that have changed hands by that 
late 1990s is even higher. Each new lease holder paid the original lease holder 
for the value associated with that "gift" when they > purchased their ranch and 
lease(s) at full market value. That, value, according to Iqbal, is the advantage 
related to the economy of scale that is retained in these larger operations 
through federal grazing allotments.
THE TRUE COST OF GRAZING LEASES
Underling Iqbal's theory is the assumption that the total costs of grazing on 
public lands are generally equivalent to the total cost of grazing on private 
lands. This assumption is based on studies that found that the non-fee costs 
were higher on public land due to increased costs from herding and moving 
livestock, transportation, lost animals, improvements and maintenance. These 
increased costs make the total cost of public land allotments equal to those of 
private leases.
The question of the "true costs" of grazing on public lands remains a highly 
debated issue and has been the object numerous articles and studies. Its 
importance comes largely from the legal mandate in the Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act of 1976 (PL 94-579) that requires, "The United States 
receive fair market value of the use of the public lands and their resources..." 
(§ 102(a)). It is almost universally acknowledged that the fees charged for the 
use of Forest Service and BLM allotments are less that those charged for 
private and (most) state allotments.
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It is, however, also generally agreed that the costs to the rancher of 
running cattle on federal lands are somewhat more than those of private lands 
because of the extra services provided in those leases, and the extra costs 
associated with federal allotments. These services vary with different 
contracts, but often include fence maintenance, salt and watering, and may 
include transportation and herding. The extra expenses o f federal land may 
include increased animal loss, riding and herding, maintaining 
improvements, paperwork, and dealing with federal bureaucrats.
There is extensive disagreement, however, over the difference between the
(average) total costs of grazing on federally leased compared to the (average)
©
total costs of grazing on private leases. Some studies (Bartlett et al.; Obermiller; 
Rostvold and Dudley; Torell, Van Tassell et al.) conclude that after including 
the federal fee, the total costs of federal and private leases are comparable, and 
that some ranchers are paying even higher costs for federal leases. The data 
for these studies came through extensive surveying of ranchers, who were 
asked detailed questions about their public and private land operational costs.
Not surprisingly, these studies and their methodologies are disputed by 
environmentalists and others, partly because the figures used for estimating 
average costs are often based on surveys of the ranchers themselves, and not 
on outside accounting methods. Jacobs also points to evidence gathered in the 
Committee on Government Operations that show extensive (illegal) subleasing 
of federal leases at rates approaching private lease rates, and concludes that if 
there is someone willing to pay a higher price, that allotments' forage must 
have that higher value.
Other studies (Gee et al.; Obermiller and Lambert; Rimbey; USDI and USDA 
1977) find that the total costs of federal leases are below those of private leases. 
Interestingly, well before the requirement that fees be based on fair market
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value, Gardner reports that, "The ranchers in the survey who had Bureau of
Land Management permits reported no cost differences between renting
“\  •
private pastures and BLM district grazing, except for fencing expense" (55). He 
also finds that not including fees, ranchers with Forest Service permits have 
higher costs, but these costs are still well below the total cost of private leases.
One element offered as significant, but often overlooked as part of this 
debate, is the question of whether the cost of the interest from the investment 
in the permit value of mortgaged ranches should be included as part of the 
total cost of federal leases. The agencies and courts have ruled that in 
determining grazing fees, it should not be considered (because they do not 
recognize the legal existence of permit value). Many economists argue that the 
cost of interest from loans needs to be included, because failure to do so creates 
the apparent discrepancy found in some studies between the total costs of 
public and private leases.
After examining the arguments over the "true cost of leases," it appears that 
the expectation of savings on forage costs, and the additional savings from the 
economies of scale that come along with the ranches' increased size are both
important factors that can lead to the development of permit value for 
allotments tied to ranch operations. Any profitable ranch may benefit from
increased carrying capacity, below market forage costs or savings from the - 
economy of scale. The increased carrying capacity that comes with a permit 
gives it larger income and profit potential. Over and above increased carrying 
capacity, any other savings from lower fees or economy o f scale should be 
seen as extra benefits which would increase permit value.
Obviously, ranch operations and their associated allotments are extremely 
varied, so different ranches benefit from these factors to different degrees.
Generally,, in smaller operations it is likely that expected savings would be the
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least significant. In mid-sized operations it is likely that expected savings on 
forage costs would be significant, and there would be some savings due to 
economy of scale. In larger operations, where the costs of fencing, herding 
and riding are more likely to decrease with size and the expected savings on 
monthly forage costs increase, the savings from the economics o f scale 
become more significant.
ESTIMATIONS OF PERMIT VALUE
There have been over twenty different studies attempting to determine the 
permit value of public land allotments. As can be seen from Tables 1-3, the 
studies vary in method, date, and location, thus it is difficult to directly 
compare them. No method claims to be completely accurate, and most of the 
studies focus on finding an average permit value for a specific state over a 
specific time.
Each method has some tendency to focus on certain factors that weigh the 
results. The capitalization method is dependent on the expectation of savings 
from public land forage, and often ignores documentation on sale values. 
Surveys of ranchers, appraisers and Realtors are dependent on perceived 
values and are thus influenced by national politics, local policy enforcement 
by BLM and Forest Service officials, and the degree of interest and influence 
of environmentalists in a particular area. Results based on regression analyses 
are dependent on the hedonic model chosen, and various models can give 
different results to the same sets of data. Models are chosen and modified in 
attempts to produce results that realistically reflect the importance of each 
chosen factor in the real estate market, but it is possible that some of these 
modifications are influenced by expected results rather than actual market- 
based influences and variations.
Table : Permit Va ue bv Method
Study Notes Method Years Location $/BLMAUM $/FSAUM
Gardner Capitalization 1950-1958 NW Colorado 44 23
Gee Capitalization 1980 Colorado 71-76
Rimbey Capitalization 1984 Idaho 29 29
Workman Capitalization 1992 Oregon 36
Gardner Survey 1958 NW Colorado 1 1 1 6
Roberts Survey Pre-1963 Utah 10 20
Fowler & Gray > Survey 1965 New Mexico 46 49
Ferguson Survey 1979 New Mexico 56-74 79-97
Fowler & Gray Survey 1979 New Mexico 71 ' 82
USDA&USDI $30-348 Appraisal 1 983 11 States Ave 68 68
Martin & Jeffries Regression Pre-1966 Arizona 1 3 23
Winter & Whittaker Regression 1970-1978 E. Oregon As deeded As deeded
Workman & King Regression 1975-1980 Utah 30 30
Rowen & Workman Regression 1975-1987 Utah 22 22
Igbal Regression 1978-1993 E. OR & Nev 37 37
Spahr & Sunderman Regression 1979-1983 Wyoming 64-220 142-275
Torell & Fowler Regression 1979-1985 New Mexico 93 93
Torell & Doll Regression 1979-1988 New Mexico 68 68
Rowen & Workman Regression 1980-1988 Utah 42 42
Collins Regression 1980-1981 Wyoming 55
Torell & Doll Peak year Regression 1982 New Mexico 100 150
Sunderman & Spahr Regression 1986-1989 Wyoming^ 0 or 12 46-66
Kincaid Regression 1987-1994 New Mexico 80-90 60-105
Spahr & Sunderman Regression 1989-1993 Wyoming 0-59 188
Torell et al. Regression 1992 Wyoming 36 47
Torell et al. Regression 1992 Idaho . 37 42
Torell et al. Regression 1992 New Mexico 89 72
Torell & Kincaid Various 1982 New Mexico 125 1 45
Torell & Kincaid Various 1988 New Mexico 75 70
Torell & Kincaid Various 1994 New Mexico . 87 60
Table 2: Permit Value by Date
Study Notes Method Years Location $/BLMAUM $/FSAUM
Gardner Capitalization 1950-1958 NW Colorado 44 23
Gardner Survey 1958 NW Colorado 1 1 16
Roberts Survey Pre-1963 Utah 10 20
Martin & Jeffries Regression. Pre-1966 Arizona 13 23
Fowler & Gray Survey 1965 New Mexico 46 49
Winter & Whittaker Regression 1970-1978 E. Oregon As deeded As deeded
Workman & King Regression 1975-1980 Utah 30 30
Rowen & Workman Regression 1975-1987 Utah 22 22
Iqbal Regression 1978-1993 E. OR & Nev 37 37
Ferguson Survey 1979 New Mexico 56-74 79-97
Fowler & Gray Survey 1979 New Mexico 71 82
Spahr & Sunderman Regression 1979-1983 Wyoming 64-220 142-275
Torell & Fowler Regression 1979-1985 New Mexico 93 93
Torell & Doll Regression 1979-1988 New Mexico 68 68
Rowen & Workman Regression 1980-1988 Utah 42 42
Gee Capitalization 1 980 Colorado 71-76
Collins Regression 1980-1981 Wyoming 55
Torell & Doll Peak year Regression 1982 New Mexico 100 150
Torell & Kincaid Various 1982 New Mexico 125 145
US DA & USDI $30-348 Appraisal 1983 11 States Ave 68 68
Rimbey Capitalization 1984 Idaho 29 29
Sunderman & Spahr Regression 1986-1989 Wyoming 0 or 12 46-66
Kincaid Regression 1987-1994 New Mexico 80-90 60-105
Torell & Kincaid Various 1988 New Mexico 75 70
Spahr & Sunderman Regression 1989-1993 Wyoming 0-59 188
Workman Capitalization 1992 Oregon 36
Torell et al. Regression 1992 Wyoming 36 47
Torell et al. Regression 1992 Idaho 37 42
Torell et al. Regression 1992 New Mexico 89 72
Torell & Kincaid Various 1994 New Mexico 87 60
Table 3: Permit Value by State
Study Notes Method Years Location $/BLMAUM $/FSAUM
Gardner Capitalization 1950-1958 NW Colorado 44 23
Gardner Surv. Ranchers 1958 NW Colorado 11 16
Gee Capitalization 1980 Colorado 71-76
Roberts Survey Pre-1963 Utah 1 0 20
Workman & King Regression 1975-1980 Utah 30 30
Rowen & Workman Regression 1975-1987 Utah 22 22
Rowen & Workman Regression 1980-1988 Utah 42 42
Martin & Jeffries Regression Pre-1966 Arizona 1 3 23
Fowler & Gray Survey .1965 New Mexico 46 49
Ferguson Survey 1979 New Mexico 56-74 79-97
Fowler & Gray Survey 1979 New Mexico 71 82
Torell & Fowler Regression 1979-1985 New Mexico 93 93
Torell & Doll Regression 1979-1988 New Mexico 68 68
Torell & Doll Peak year Regression 1982 New Mexico 100 150
Torell & Kincaid Various 1982 New Mexico 125 145
Kincaid Regression 1987-1994 New Mexico 80-90 60-105
Torell & Kincaid Various 1988 New Mexico 75 70
Torell et al. Regression 1992 New Mexico. 89 72
Torell & Kincaid Various 1994 New Mexico 87 60
Winter & Whittaker Regression 1970-1978 E. Oregon As deeded As deeded
Iqbal Regression 1978-1993 E. OR & Nev 37 37
Workman Capitalization 1992 Oregon 36
Spahr & Sunderman Regression 1979-1983 Wyoming 64-220 142-275
Collins Regression 1980-1981 Wyoming 55
Sunderman & Spahr Regression 1986-1989 Wyoming 0 or 12 46-66
Spahr & Sunderman Regression 1989-1993 Wyoming 0-59 188
Torell et al. Regression 1992 Wyoming 36 47
Rimbey Capitalization 1984 Idaho 29 29
Torell et al. Regression 1992 Idaho 37 42
USDA & USDI $30-348 Appraisal 1983 11 States Ave 68 68
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The first serious attempt at evaluating permit value was published by B. 
Delworth Gardner in 1962. He discovered that the permit value, tabulated 
through a survey of ranchers who had recently bought or sold allotments, was 
much lower than the value he expected to find using the capitalization method. 
He thought the difference was due in part to, "transfer restrictions [which] 
may be preventing permits from moving to ranches (ranchers) where they 
would have greater economic value." He also found that 44% of Forest Service 
permits in the study area were reduced upon transfer, and in some of these 
areas there was an expectation that cuts would continue in the future, further 
reducing permit value.
For BLM allotments considered in that study, reductions were not a 
significant factor. Gardner’s argument is that for BLM allotments the greater 
differential between the surveyed value ($10.92) and those expected through 
capitalization ($44.33) is due to transfer restrictions that were even more 
limiting than those of the Forest Service. Although it is true that BLM transfer 
restriction are more limiting, as BLM allotments cannot be transferred with 
the sale of livestock, this argument is not very convincing. Since BLM 
allotments almost always abut to the deeded ranch, and are sometimes even 
enclosed by the ranch they are tied to, they are almost certainly more valuable
to that ranch, rather than another ranch further away. Rimbey, who also
predicts permit value through the capitalization method, had a more 
reasonable explanations for this discrepancy, for he includes expenses that
Gardner does not for BLM lands, bringing the value predicted by capitalization 
down to a value similar, to Forest Service lands. Others have noted that BLM 
lands tend to be less productive than Forest Service lands.
Values calculated for permits using capitalization methods are clearly 
dependent on both the expected monthly savings for forage and the
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capitalization rate used, as well as the formula used t o , figure the value of the 
capitalized savings. Methods used to figure this capitalized value vary. 
Workman and Gardner both use a "simple" formula that divides the expected
A
savings by the capitalization rate: (Value of forage) - (Cost of forage)/
(Capitalization rate). However Workman uses a capitalization rate of 8%,
compared to 6% for Gee et al.
Rimbey also uses a capitalization rate of 8%, but uses a different formula to
figure out how much a "prudent investor" would pay for a permit (5):
Assuming the annual cash cost savings remains constant over a period 
of years, we can derive an estimate of the amount a prudent investor 
would pay to take advantage of these cost savings. The investor should 
be willing to invest up to the net present value (NPV) of the stream of 
benefits (or cost savings) or,
n
NPV = E (PVTn - BLMnl 
j= l (l+i)n
w h e re :
j = years from 1 to n
i = interest rate
PVTn = private costs year n
BLM = BLM costs year n
Using this equation he finds that. "With a 30 year investment period and
8 percent discount rate, the net present value of the $2.59 cost savings would
be $29 per AUM."
Gee et al. do not actually figure out the per AUM permit value of the ranch 
values that they are studying, but in two cases permit value can be calculated 
from the figures he uses. In breaking down the worth of a Central Mountain 
Colorado ranch, he places the value of 1790 AUMs at $135,750, after calculating 
that $7.50/month savings would be capitalized at 10%. This divides out to a 
permit value of $75.84/AUM. For another ranch he places the value of 910 
AUMs at $65,000, with a $3.58/month savings calculated at 12%, for a permit 
value of $71.43/AUM. The variation in capitalization rates is explained by
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Figure 2: Grazing permit values in New Mexico, 1966-1994.
From Torell et al. 1994.
400
350
300
Deeded
250
BLM
200 USFS
150
100
50
0
66 68 70 72 90 92 947674 80 82 84 86 8878
1966-79 values tram Fowler and Gmy (1960) 
198668 values tram ToreB and Oof (1989) 
1987-94 valuee tram Kincaid (1993)
Year
5 6
regional differences in production and in real estate market value. Gee et al. do 
not make clear what formula they use for capitalization.
If each of these studies used only the same "simple" method for 
capitalization, Gardner, Rimbey, and Workman's data would show, for their 
increased values of BLM forage calculated at $2.66, $2.59, and $2.89 
respectively, only a small variance in range of permit values ranging from 
$32-$36. In contrast, Rimbey finds the increased value o f Forest Service forage 
to be $0.52, compared with $1.38 for Gardner, and up to $7.50 for Gee et al., 
making the range of permit values (again using the simple method at 8%) to 
be $7 for Rimbey, $17 for Gardner, and $45 and $94 for Gee et al. The last two 
figure are clearly much higher, but they are for specific ranches and not 
averages for a set of data on ranch sales. They could be reflecting unusually 
beneficial allotments. In any case, the figures for estimating permit value 
though the capitalization method are clearly dependent on the expected 
savings from public land forage and the formula used.
Permit values determined through surveys appear consistent with various 
factors that will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. In brief, they 
generally increase over time, partly due to inflation and partly due to an 
increase in ranch values over and above the inflation rate. They also reflect 
higher values associated with the year-round allotment leases generally found 
in New Mexico and Arizona. The study with the eleven state average seems to 
find unusually high permit values, but its results come from data reflecting 
the period that is generally considered the height for both ranch and permit 
va lues.
The first attempt at using regression analysis to determine permit value was 
done by Martin and Jefferies for Arizona ranches sold from 1957-1963. They 
tried twelve different formulations on a relatively simple model with only six
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variables, from which they chose four equations that gave similar results:
values of $13/AUM for BLM leases and $23/AUM for Forest Service leases. These
values are lower than other values found for year-round leases of that era.
This can be explained in part because their procedure was, "based on the
rancher's actual use of the land rather than th e . agency-suggested stocking 
*
rates. This procedure increases the animal-units figure on "section 15 BLM 
lands by a factor of about two." They do not indicate the extent of section 15 
lands compared to section 2 and 3 lands, but if the agency-suggested levels 
were used, the AUM value for those lands would presumable double. Another
factor that might have influenced their results was the use of deeded acres as a
factor, rather than deeded AUMs. Intuitively, it would make sense to used the 
latter, considering all the leases were measured in AUMs. Later regression 
models do make that change.
The most extensive set of regression models used to determine permit value 
have been done by Torell and his student Kincaid, in combination with a 
number of other scholars. They have done numerous studies of ranch and 
permit values in New Mexico from 1979 to 1994, which follow the work of 
Fowler and Gray who studied the same values through surveys from 1966-1979.
(See Figure 2.) They found that changes in permit values generally follow 
changes in ranch values and that both peaked around 1982.
The results from the three studies by Sunderman and Spahr, looking at data 
from sales between 1979 and 1993 in Wyoming, are based on models that differ 
from those used in New Mexico, and most of their results are inconsistent with 
other studies of permit value. They were the only ones to find no permit value 
for any set of BLM leases, and their results for Forest Service leases during two 
of the three periods studied were much higher than expected. I cannot explain 
their results. One factor that may have influenced their results from studying
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175 sales was the inclusion of sales taking places through auction (16) and 
repossession (63). Other studies did not include such sales.
FACTORS INFLUENCING PERMIT VALUE
Looking . through the variety of permit value studies, despite some variation, 
one of the most remarkable aspects of the accumulated results is their general
consistency. With the exception of the results for BLM allotments in
Sunderman and Spahr, every study found that permits had value Studies also 
consistently found that permit values peaked around 1982, after an era of
generally rising values for ranches. They also found that year-round
allotment leases in New Mexico consistently had more value per AUM
(typically about double) than allotments in states to the north that could only 
be used for part of the year.
Most of the studies of permit value agreed that "with reasonably simple 
explanations, location, year, and length of grazing season can be identified as 
basic factors influencing permit values. Some studies also identified a . few
other factors that were likely to influence permit values, through the 
influence that they could have on either fee levels or AUM levels. These 
include the passing of new environmental laws and some federal court
decisions on how to implement those laws. Also noted were some trends in
national politics that could affect the stability of fee or AUM levels,
particularly the "Sagebrush Rebellion" and the controversies surrounding the 
Clinton/Babbitt RR '94 measures. On a more localized level, the likelihood of 
reductions in AUMs due to the ecology of the region, grazing practices, the
presence of endangered species, and the enforcement practices of federal 
officials also influenced permit values. The degree -that these issues actually
effect permit value is difficult to determine.
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ESTIMATING THE TOTAL NATIONAL VALUE OF PERMITS
In 1968, Roberts and Nielson published what is probably the first attempt to 
make some estimate of the collective worth of federal grazing permits. They 
were estimating the loss of permit value if fees were raised to the full value of 
the forage. They took their estimate of $10/AUM for BLM leases in Utah and 
used simple multiplication to find a value of $13.5 million for 1.35 million 
AUMs. They also noted that implementing such a fee increase would mean an 
additional yearly cost to ranchers of $434,000 annually.
In 1980, in "Economic Analysis in Public Ranchland Management," Nelson 
estimates that, "The total capital value of all grazing on BLM rangelands is 
very likely no more than $1 billion." In their 1996 work, "Market Forces Would 
Benefit US Rangelands," Holechek and Hess estimate that 25-30% of all federal 
AUMs could be purchases for less than $420 million, making the total worth of 
all federal AUMs less than $1.68 billion.
In 1993 there were 13,303,068 BLM AUMs and 8,7.65,829 Forest Service AUMs 
for a combined total of 22,068,897 AUMs (USDI BLM). Using $150/AUM, one of 
the highest permit values found for year-round allotments, the total permit 
value for all allotments would be $3.31 billion. Using the 11 state average 
permit value level of $68, the combined permit value would be a bit over $1.5 
billion. Since this figure comes from one of, the years with the highest permit 
values, the current average is probably closer to $50/AUM, which would give a 
total national permit value of $1.1 billion.
CHAPTER 4
PERMIT VALUE AS A FACTOR OF RANCHERS' POLITICS:
How Important Is It?
This chapter attempts to characterize how important permit value is to
ranchers with allotments, and to identify its significance to other ranchers,
environmentalists, academics and public land managers. This discussion and
the results' of the informal survey that are presented, clearly are not and are 
not intended as a wide-scale sociological study or survey of this issue. Instead 
this chapter will only attempt to reveal the wide variety of insights and 
reactions of individuals close to the issue, through their own words and 
explanations. The hope is to illustrate the range of both emotional and 
intellectual responses to permit value, and to some degree, to the wider issues 
in the continuing controversy over managing public land grazing. My theory 
is that an unbiased presentation of these beliefs may help expedite reform 
e ffo rts .
It must be understood that the survey conducted as part of this thesis is 
informal in nature, due to the following two factors. The first is the sample 
size. Although the total number of interviews (43) approaches a significant 
sampling, the results are broken down and interpreted by category (i.e. 
academic, land manager, etc.), and the sample size in each category is clearly 
not large enough for clear numerical results from a statistical analysis.
Why bother with a survey that does not produce clear numerical results? For 
the purpose of this thesis, there are three reasons. First, one of the principle 
aims of this work is to show that permit value is an important factor in 
ranchers' political motivations, and thus any positive responses indicating its 
importance are significant, even if they are subjective. Second, this survey
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was always intended to be used along with the specific economic and historical 
evidence presented in the earlier chapters and not intended to stand on its
own. Finally, the process of conducting the surveys was an important tool to 
open up the discussion about permit value with the interviewees and put it in 
the context of the larger debate over public land grazing.
The other factor that makes this survey informal is the discussions between 
the author and the interviewees. Although the complete intent of the survey 
was not revealed, the interviewees did not go into the survey completely
"blind." For most, in order to get them to take the survey, they had to know
something about me and the topic. Also, while each question was asked in a 
specific order, and specifically worded, during the interviews some of the 
questions needed further explanation for some of the interviewees. Also, 
between answers other issues were sometimes broached and discussed before 
returning to the survey questions.
THE SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
The Q uestions
The questions used in the survey are presented in Appendix A. There are 
three sets of questions, each posed to different groups. The questions in each 
set are grouped into six sections, with each section containing one or more
specific questions. The questions in the first four sections sets vary to reflect
/
the group they are addressing. The questions in the first three sections in 
each set cover issues not directly related to permit value and are not collated. 
The results of the last three questions are specific to permit value and are 
shown in Tables 4-6.
The questions in Section One were designed to elicit the background of the 
interviewees and their experience with ranching. For permittees, Section Two
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asks for background on their allotments, and for ranchers without allotments, 
whether they ever had an allotment. This is followed by Section Three that
asks for the ranchers' perception of the allotment system. For all other groups,
it is Section Two that asks for their perception of the allotment system and
Section Three that asks for suggested changes to the allotment system.
The questions in Section Four seek to confirm the existence of permit value 
and to get an estimate from each interviewee of the permit value of a federal 
allotment AUM. For ranchers with allotments, they are asked the value of their 
allotments' AUMs, For all other groups the question is not asked of a specific 
allotment. All groups are then asked whether permit value is increasing or
d e c rea s in g .
Section Five asks the question at the core of this thesis, "How big of an 
influence do you feel the real estate value of grazing permits is in the 
resistance of ranchers to cuts in their AUM levels?” This question was chosen 
because the resistance to AUM cuts takes place on local, regional and national 
levels. It can be seen in the permittees' interactions with the agencies during
the development of AMPs, which are often developed in part through 
negotiation with agency officials. The resistance often becomes more apparent 
if an AMP is appealed up the ladder of agency decision-makers. These appeals
can end up in Washington D.C., or occasionally in the courts. This resistance
comes from individual ranchers, various ranching associations, and sometimes
banks or politicians. The resistance is also reflected in proposed national 
leg is la tio n .
Section Six assumes that much of ranchers' resistance to AUM cuts is 
financial, and asks for reactions to two possible measures that would mitigate 
some of that financial impact. Section Six originally had two questions: "How 
would you feel about a system that compensated ranchers for forced AUM
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reductions?" and "How about a system that allowed a willing rancher to retire 
an allotment for compensation?" After about a dozen interviews the first 
question was split into two questions after it became clear that the answers to 
it varied depending on why the reductions were called for. The two questions 
distinguish whether the reductions were due to the prioritization of other 
uses, or due to overgrazing. The interviewees who were not asked . both 
questions had their answers tabulated only with the answers to Question 6a.
•N.
During the interviews, the question arose as to whether a retired allotment 
would ever be grazed again, as some of the interviewees were afraid that the
flora in allotments that are not grazed would become decadent, as it got
overgrown, dried out and fail to re-seed, thus becoming a potential fire hazard. 
When these issues came up, the question was clarified to allow for the 
possibility that the area could be grazed under agency prescription for 
ecological considerations.
The Selection  Process
In selecting individuals to be interviewed, there were four basic criteria 
that influenced the process: regional diversity, diversity of background, 
familiarity with the issue, and a willingness to undergo the survey. Academics, 
officials, environmentalists, the reporter and farm credit bureau employees 
knowledgeable and willing to discuss permit value were not difficult to find.
Academics were chosen who had published articles focusing on permit value 
or related issues. I made contact with many of the environmentalists at a 
grazing conference sponsored by the National Wildlife Federation. Most of the 
officials were found through phone calls to various agency offices.
During the interviews with members of the previous groups, I asked them 
for contacts with ranchers who might be willing to talk about permit value
6 4
and take the survey. Approximately half of the ranchers and the banker were
found through this process. Three others were found through a personal 
contact who came from a ranching family in Montana. Five other ranchers
were found through contacting various cattlemen's associations for 
re fe re n c e s .
Initially, I hoped to get at least five interviewees in each category. As the 
interviews were taking place I decided to do more than five to help provide 
more regional diversity, as many of my initial contacts were in Montana.
Remarkably, all but one of the individuals that I asked agreed to be
interviewed. During the process it also became clear that the interviewees' 
knowledge of permit value, varied. The individuals who were interviewed, 
along with their city of residence, are listed in Appendix B.
Conducting the Survey
The interviews took place from May to August of 1997. The original intention 
was to conduct most of the interviews in person, during a trip around the West. 
Ultimately it became clear that would be impossible due to limited time and 
resources, so all except five interviews were conducted over the phone. One of 
the in-person interviews was conducted on the campus of the University of 
Montana, and three were at the homes of ranchers near Ennis, Montana.
During an initial phone contact, one interviewee requested to receive the 
questions over e-mail. This was done and he responded in kind.
In my attempt not to influence the result of the survey, the interviewees 
were initially to ld . very little about either me or the survey. They were told 
that I was a graduate student from the University of Montana, who was 
working on issues in grazing economics and seeking to move the grazing 
debate. forward by creating new options in public land management. Most did
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not know what department I was in, although I did tell them if they asked, and 
a few knew through previous contact.
They were also told that the survey was about permit value and that they 
would be told more about the intention of the survey and given a chance to ask 
questions after it was over. During the survey, many of the interviewees 
needed clarification as to what specifically was meant by permit value, as some 
had difficulty splitting up the year-to-year economic benefits of allotment 
from the real estate value of allotments.
I
In terp retin g  the R esults
Most of the answers to the last three questions have easily interpretable yes, 
no, or maybe answers. Two others, Questions 4b and 5, did have a range of 
answers that presented some difficulty in categorizing. Also, many of the 
interviewees did not give specific answers for Questions 4b and 4c. The 
answers to Question 4b were sometimes presented in a range, which was 
averaged for the survey results. Others had more than one answer, specifying 
different permit value levels for different regions. Since there were so few 
to ta l. answers, these extra answers were included in the results.
The answers to Question 5 were the m ost. difficult to interpret. The results are 
presented in the categories, Major, Very, Somewhat, and, Minor/None. Not all 
of the answers fit exactly into these categories. Some of the other answers 
included, "The Biggest" or "THE Influence," which were included under 
"major." Others included, "One of the biggest," and, "It's significant, up to 50%," 
which were put under, "Very." The responses, "Some," "Significant," and, "It 
runs the gamut," where put under "Somewhat." "Not much," and "It's more the 
year-to-year operational value—that indicates whether they'd have to sell," 
were put under, "Minor/None." Generally if there was doubt, the rule that was
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followed was to put the answers in a category that indicated the lesser 
s ig n if ic a n c e .
THE SURVEY RESULTS 
R anchers W ith A llotm ents
The seven ranchers with allotments were generally happy with the 
allotment system, although two believed that it needed significant changes and 
others had various complaints. One thought that there should be more on-the- 
ground management and less time spent on planning. Others wanted more 
flexibility and security in the system, such as longer leases or easier ways to 
change allotment boundaries. Still others wanted more sidebars, i.e., a clearer 
system of allotment management standards from the agencies.
The permittees were unanimous in believing that they paid something for 
their allotments, whether it was due to permit value, estate taxes, the cost of 
improvements, or simply, as one put it, "blood, sweat and tears." Of the seven, 
three believed that permit values were decreasing, including one who thought 
that his allotment had lost all of its value; The rancher who valued his AUMs at 
more than $100 each was predictably from the Southwest, where year-long 
grazing on allotments is prevalent.
The permittees' reaction to the importance of permit value in resisting AUM 
reductions was mixed, covering the gamut from "none," to "the most important 
factor." Some of the comments that came with the answer to this question are 
revealing. One rancher thought that it was, "Not as big as it used to be. Most 
[permittees] have already devalued their AUMs." Another thought it was a "big 
factor with some ranchers, especially in the South[west]," and perhaps most
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revealing was the comment by Bud Eppers, President of the New Mexico Public 
Lands Council, that permit value's influence was, "Extremely big-—depending 
on their level of [dependence on] federal land."
Permittees also overwhelmingly (six to one) favored compensation for 
reduced AUMs if the reduction was a result of an agency decision to benefit 
other uses, although many clearly believed that there weren’t many cases in 
which such reductions were warranted, particularly if the reductions were 
the result of increased recreational use. Interestingly, however, the one who 
opposed this plan favored compensation if "the resource [forage potential] was 
actually damaged." Other permittees vehemently opposed giving compensation 
for AUM reductions that were required due to overgrazing.
The permittees were evenly split over the possibility of developing a 
voluntary allotment retirement system. Those opposed had comments such as, 
"We shouldn't waste the renewable resource," or "the elk won't like it," and 
thought it would limit the opportunities for new ranchers to get started. 
Alternatively, some who favored the plan thought that there were, many 
ranchers ready to retire, whose heirs did not want to go into ranching, but 
who continued only to prevent the ranch from subdivision. Another assessed 
the situation, stating, "Many allotments have gotten too expensive." One was OK 
with this plan, but favored a grassbanking system, which will be discussed 
extensively in the next chapter. The last wanted a "clear new system for 
economics of the area, and some sort of lease for new users." The one who was 
undecided believed, "Government shouldn't have to pay for everything," but 
was more supportive if the money came from local governments or private 
sources.
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R anchers W ithout A llotm ents
The eight ranchers without allotments had various opinions of the allotment 
system, describing it as confusing, burdensome, and unfairly distributed. Half 
thought that it subsidized the permittees, and two thought the fees should go 
up. In describing permittees, one even said, "I've used the term, 'God's chosen, 
people.' These ranchers have a competitive advantage. These ranches don't add 
much to the local economy." In contrast, another rancher noted, "I'd love to 
have seen the Sagebrush Rebellion. The feds should get out of land, 
business...[and],..save on management and employees.
.These ranchers also consistently believed that allotments had permit value, 
but they had very little knowledge or opinion of its dollar value or trend. One 
noted, "Yes, they pay for them, but we own them, so they're paying for 
something that they don't own." The nonpermittees also had very little direct 
knowledge of the influence of permit value over the permittees' politics. Most, 
through contact with ranchers who had allotments, understood that it had
some influence, but had difficulty in determining the extent of that influence, 
or realized that it varied extensively depending on individual circumstances.
The nonpermittees were generally not supportive of compensation for 
forced reductions, disagreeing with any more government buy outs or
subsidies, and they were completely unsupportive of any compensation for 
reductions that were due to overgrazing. One disagreed with a compensation 
system because, "The government can’t pay someone to give, up their way of 
life." Another who agreed with some forms of compensation believed, "It's
much like a private right—even though it isn't really."
The nonpermittees were evenly split over the possibility of compensation 
for the voluntary retirement of allotments and thus more supportive of it than 
of compensation for forced reductions. One compared the voluntary
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retirement plan to the dairy buy out. Those who did not support this plan 
generally did not support buy outs or subsides, or believed the government 
should not pay for something it owned anyway.
A c a d e m i c s  *
The seven academic interviewees were generally agricultural economists or 
range ecologists. They had numerous suggestions for improving the allotment 
system, including the removal of base property requirements, increasing the 
option of taking "non-use" on allotments, and increasing data collection 
because too many decisions were being made only from "professional 
judgment." These issues will be discussed more extensively in the next chapter.
One academic offered this insight into the social and political atmosphere of
the ranching community:
Part of the problem is that the ranching community is very defensive 
because they're running scared. They’re, afraid that they're being shut 
out, or that people want to shut them out and so they tend to develop a 
sort of circle-up-the-wagon mentality. They try to protect everybody 
when in fact there are some that don't deserve to be operating. Agencies 
should have the clout to do something about those who are doing it
wrong, but they should also be able to reward the ones who are putting
in the extra effort.
These comments reflect some of the conversations that took place during the 
survey, where many ranchers either admitted or complained that there were 
poorly run allotments that made them all look bad. Some seemed to want the 
agencies to be stricter, but few, if any, were asking for that publicly.
The academics were also unanimous in believing that permit value exists, 
but they generally believed it to be on average less valuable than ranchers 
did. The one who though its value was $100 or more was again for the 
Southwest. Four saw it declining in value over the last few years, compared to
one who saw a recent resurgence. One noted that the decline was making,
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"bankers very nervous," as many of the permits were security on borrowed 
m oney .
All of the academics believed that permit value had some significance to the
resistance of AUM cuts, with four of them believing that it was a major or the
biggest influence, and three thought it had some significance that varied with
*■
the rancher. One again tied permit value's-influence to its collateral value, 
saying that it is, "The biggest single component, especially for ranchers with 
loans still out." He also noted, "The problems with federal assessment 
techniques is probably second." Another academic thought tha.t, "Ranchers 
have more of a cash flow problem than an equity problem," and similarly, that 
the overall, "economy of the operation is a much bigger factor."
The academics were overwhelmingly in support of compensation plans, with 
the exception of reductions that were called for due to overgrazing or misuse. 
The one who supported compensation even for overgrazed land had an 
important insight, finding that overgrazing is* "so often OK'd by the agency 
that rancher shouldn't be blamed." Another who was wrestling with the idea 
of compensating for required reduction thought, "Compensation needs to be 
enough to replace forage." Yet another supported compensation despite noting 
that it, "hurts communities both in PILT [payments in lieu of taxes] and in 
general economic loss."
G overnm ent Land M anagers
The eight public land managers who where interviewed had a variety of 
opinions about the allotment system. Some thought it worked pretty well. One 
saw the "permit system [as] out-of-date—a closed system, [with] lots of permit 
related paperwork, and not enough focus on land management." Two others 
thought a competitive bidding system may be better. All agreed that permit
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value existed, but only half saw a trend for that value and only two put a dollar 
value on it.
Most of the land managers thought that permit value had some influence in
the resistance to AUM cuts, but many also believed that the lack of
understanding and education about ecological issues was an important
influence, as was the ranchers' general resistance to change. One official
stated, "Some will take a voluntary cut, if the AUM levels stays the same,"
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noting that his agency often had an easier time negotiating in-the-field 
changes in allotment season of use, as long as the total number of AUMs on 
face of permit were not changed. This allows the permit to retain its collateral 
and market value. One who believed that permit value was not significant 
thought, "Most don't think in those terms. They're not planning on selling."
The managers also had a range of opinions on the compensation plans. They 
generally supported compensation for forced reductions. One supporter of the 
concept thought, "All carrots are positive," and another believed, "If it's based 
on benefits for the public good, than it's no different from other takings. It 
would ease the managers' job." Another who agreed with the idea thought, 
"Better to give them other range first." One manager was, "Not in favor, 
because that infers a property right." All but one of the managers were 
clearly against compensating permittees for reduction due to overgrazing. 
Their comments included, "I'd hate to see bad ranchers rewarded for poor 
management," and, "If it's based on the individual's poor management, 
stewardship, or lack of cooperation, than there is a problem."
The widest range of opinions was on the voluntary compensation plan.
While one supporter thought, "That would save the taxpayer millions of 
dollars. The compensation should be based on fair market," another thought it 
was, "better to take away allotments upon the transfer, of land." Others were
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worried about what the land would be used for if not grazed, saying, "I 
wouldn't support it unless the next use was designated," or "No, it shouldn't be 
left up to the discretion of the rancher. It should be more based on ecological 
co n sid e ra tio n s ."
E n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s
The seven environmentalists generally wanted to see some reductions in 
public land grazing levels and as least one wanted, "to see all livestock 
jemoved from all public land, or at least all high value land— [then] sell the 
other to ranchers." They also wanted stricter enforcement of existing 
regulations and better monitoring. One thought that the allotment system 
would be better if the maximum permit was approximately for 350 head, or 10% 
above economic requirement of what it takes to raise a family.
Only one environmentalist wasn't clear as to whether permit value existed, 
but that activist worked exclusively in an area where the subdivision of 
ranches was by far the major problem and where private land values has 
skyrocketed, making permit value insignificant. The activists^ believed that in 
some areas permit value ranged higher than $100/AUM, but generally found 
permits to range from $25/AUM to S50/AUM, and were split on the trend of 
that value.
The environmentalists' opinion of the significance of permit value had the 
broadest split, with five of the interviewees thinking it was a major force and 
two finding it relatively insignificant. Two activists clearly thought that the 
influence of the banks was a big part of permit value's political significance. 
One believed it to be the "driving force, [along with] the banks submitting 
appeals [on AMPs]. The pressure to make loan payments makes the ranchers 
run more cattle. There's $10 million [of collateral value locally] on 141
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allotments— [making it] a force still bigger than year-to-year income value, 
especially in Southwest." One of the environmentalists who found permit value 
insignificant thought that philosophical resistance was more important, 
citing the case where for a number of years, someone had been offering 
ranchers $60,000 to give up their allotment, and had gotten no takers.1 9
Environmentalists favored compensation for forced AUM reduction four to 
two, with one uncertain. These numbers, however, do not reflect the sentiment 
of those who favored the plan nearly as much as one revealing comment:
"Don't like it. We should kick 'em off and give them a bill, but politically. I'd 
grit my teeth and do it, if these are permanent reductions." Environmentalists 
on both sides of this question did not believe that these reductions were 
"takings" and wanted any new rules to reflect that belief.
T h e . tables were turned on the question of compensation for overgrazed 
allotments, with four opposed, and two giving hesitant approval. One comment 
illuminates the reasoning of one of the two in favor. "My emotional side balks 
at it. The rational side says it will make it [restoring the land] easier. I've never 
really seen any other reason than poor management for any reduction." 
Another thought the plan did not go far enough, "I don't want to see it. If the 
allotment isn't viable, then the whole allotment should be bought out, and 
retired as a whole."
Despite two who were undecided, activists overwhelmingly approved 
compensation for voluntary retirement. One who had disapproved of forced 
compensation was, "OK with that. [It is] more of an incentive." Another 
environmentalist’s sentiment echoed that of the land managers, as they had
19 I have not been able to find anyone else who could substantiate that offer.
In any case that arrangement would have legal problems under the current 
allotment system.
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"mixed feelings, but the real question is how it is managed afterwards." Others 
had different reservations, "I don't want to see a property right, but if the 
[compensation] language works, then getting cows off is the priority.
Whatever we have to do is OK if it is permanent." Another noted cases where 
ranchers had, "tried for years to close their allotments for habitat," without 
success.
O ther P artic ip an ts
The six "other" interviewees, including a reporter, and assessor, a Realtor, a 
banker, and two Farm Credit Service employees, had a wide range of 
perspectives on what should be done with the allotment system. Two wanted 
significant changes with the agencies. "The Forest Service should have more 
confidence in ranchers... [they] should focus on true abusers and should back 
good stewards with less regulation." Another thought, the agencies' "biggest 
error is that they make decisions for the West as a whole." Two others saw 
much broader problems, one stating, "Some areas of the Southwest never 
should have been grazed," and another saw, "ranching as dying industry— 
more and more controlled by big money."
‘ ’ I
All of these interviewees confirmed the existence of permit value, with the 
Realtor stating succinctly, "I know they do, because I sell them." As they had 
ties to the financial community, not surprisingly, all of the interviewees but 
the reporter had opinions as to both the level and trend of permit value, with 
four thinking the trend was upward, two believing it was downward, and on 
average they figured permits were worth between $50 and $100/AUM.
These interviewees also has a wide range of opinions on the significance of 
permit value in the ranchers' resistance to AUM cuts. Some who thought it was 
important also brought up the issue of year-to-year operational value.
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Another thought, "One of the issues is that they need bigger operations. They 
need about 400 head to support a family. It's economy of scale. They must get 
bigger to survive, but permits are decreasing." One who saw permit value as 
insignificant believed that the last thing the rancher is thinking is, "I've got 
to replace the ranch."
This set of interviewees was generally unsupportive of compensation for 
forced reductions. One supporter believed that the plan was needed simply 
because, "Wildlife is getting more and more AUMs allocated." In contract, 
another thought, "It would open a can of worms. [It is] too subjective, too 
variable. Land trades are better. It would be a cyanide-coated sugar pill." This 
group was also completely unsupportive of compensation for overgrazing,
with one comment capturing their tone, "If land is beat, than no." The one who 
was undecided realized it might be difficult to clearly put the fault on the 
r a n c h e r .
This group was split on the possibility of compensating for the voluntary 
retirement of allotments. Those who agreed with the plan did not have 
extensive comments. One who opposed it said that his "business is to finance 
agriculture. They want transition from generation to generation." Another 
would, "rather see reductions. In most cases in this area, they need to be 
grazed ."
A COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS FROM VARIOUS SECTORS
Not surprisingly, there was a wide variety of concerns among the various 
groups interviewed. Fee levels, subsides, permit value, long-term economic 
stability, ecological and habitat concerns, recreation values, the demise of the
ranching way of life, agency monitoring and bureaucracy, and the influx of
subdivisions were all issues important to the interviewees. It is clear from, the
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diversity of opinions on these issues that there will never be complete 
agreement on these issues even among individuals within each group 
surveyed, never mind among all the interests involved.
Nevertheless, there was nearly unanimous agreement o n . the existence of 
permit value. There was, however, nearly an even split on Question 4c, 
whether permit value was increasing or decreasing. This could in part be 
because the question is not clear as to what year the increase or decrease 
should be measured from. Also, some of those interviewed might associate 
permit values more closely with land values than a careful economic analysis 
would. It is also likely that some of the answers reflect local trends (perhaps 
from the Realtor and bankers), while others where looking at the national
trends (as the academics may have). On a local levels, it was generally believed 
that permit .values decreased if it was thought that land managers were about
to make some reductions, and increased somewhat after the reductions were 
made. On the larger scale, with the gradual trend towards AUM reductions,
permit values would be in a gradual decline.
The range of answers regarding the dollar value of allotment AUMs varied 
as expected, but was generally consistent with the variations found in regional
economic studies done by agricultural economists. The responses generally
hovered around $50-60/AUM for seasonal allotments and a bit over $100/AUM 
for allotments grazed year-round. It is important to note that many of the 
interviewees seemed to be guessing at these figures, or admitted they were
answering with figures that they had heard from other sources. Some of the 
interviewees refused to come up with a generalized figure. Not surprisingly,
however, the permittees all had a answer for permit value levels. The only 
other group that all responded to this question were the "others"—the bankers,
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Realtor and reporter. Both of these groups deal with permit values in their 
w ork.
TABLE 4: RESULTS FROM INTERVIEW QUESTION 4
4a) Do you feel that ranchers pay for their allotments when they 
buy their ranch?
T y p e Y e s No
P e rm ittee s 6 1
N o n p erm ittees 8 0
A cadem ics 7 0
M an ag ers 8 0
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts 6 1
Other 6 0
T o ta ls 41 2
4b) How much do you feel a federally leased AUM is worth ■ now as 
part of the real estate value of a ranch?
T y p e -50 51-100 101->
P erm ittee s 3 3 1
N o n p erm ittees 1 0 0
A cadem ics 4 0 1
M an ag e rs 1 1 0
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts 2 3 0
Other 1 3 1
T o ta ls  12 10 3
4c) Has that changed over the years?
T y p e  Increased Declined
P erm ittee s 0 3
N o n p erm ittees 1 0
A cadem ics 1 4
M an ag ers 2 2
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts 2 2
Other 4 1
T o ta ls 10 12
The results from Question 5 clearly indicated that permit value is an 
important issue, at least as a reason why permittees resist cuts in their AUM 
levels. Of the forty-one responses to this question, only 22% thought that 
permit value was not factor. The remaining 78% found it to be at least some
TABLE 5: RESULTS FROM INTERVIEW QUESTION 5
78
5) How big of an influence do you feel the real estate value
grazing permits 
AUM levels?
is in the resistance of ranchers to cuts in
T y p e Major Very Somewhat Minor/None
P erm ittee s 3 0 2 2
N o n p erm ittees 1 1 4 1
A cadem ics 4 0 3 0
M an ag ers 1 2 3 2
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts  5 0 0 2
Other 1 1 1 2
TOTAL 15 4 13 9
significance. Almost half (46%) found it of very or major significance, and 
more than one-third (37%) thought it was a major influence in resisting AUM 
cuts. Most of the interviewees who thought it was a major influence believed 
that it was the most important factor in that resistance. The other issue that 
came up consistently as an important factor in that resistance was the effect 
AUM cuts had on the ranch's yearly operations and profits.
Unexpectedly, more than half the interviewees responding to Question 6a 
supported compensating ranchers for forced AUM reductions that were 
required due to endangered species and habitat concerns. Of the forty-one 
responses, 59% supported the possibility, 24% opposed it, and 17% were 
uncertain. This result was not much different than the results of the fifteen 
ranchers, of whom 53% supported, 33% opposed and 13% were undecided.
Many of the supporters specified that the compensation needed to be "fair," 
and some mentioned that it should be enough to find replacement forage. Not 
surprisingly, in Question 6b, 78% opposed compensating for AUM reductions 
due to overgrazing, and only 16% favored the possibility, with 6% remaining 
undecided . '
The results from Question 6c, on voluntary retirement of allotments, were 
similar the result of Question 6a. Of the forty-three respondents, 56% supported
7 9
the possibility, 30% were opposed, and 14% undecided. This idea was not quite 
as favorable with ranchers, of whom seven supported it, seven opposed it, and 
one was undecided. Much of the opposition and indecision was due to the 
uncertainty as to what would happen to the land and how it would be managed. 
A few were more supportive of the idea if the retired allotment would be put 
into a grassbanking system.
TABLE 6: RESULTS FROM INTERVIEW QUESTION 6
6a) How would you feel about a system that compensated ranchers 
for forced AUM reductions due to the prioritization of other uses?
T y p e Y e s No Maybe
P erm ittee s 6 1 0
N o n p erm ittees 2 4 2
A cadem ics 6 0 1
M an ag ers 5 1 1
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts 4 2 1
Other 1 2 2
T o ta ls 24 10 7
6b) How would you feel about a system that compensated ranchers 
for forced AUM reductions due to overgrazing?
T y p e Yes N o Mayl
P erm ittee s 1 3 1
N o n p erm ittees 0 7 0
A cadem ics 1 3 0
M an ag ers 1 4 0
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts 2 4 0
Other 0 4 1
T o ta ls  5 25 2
6c) How would you feel about a system that allowed a willing 
rancher to retire an allotm ent for com pensation?
T y p e Yes N o Mayl
P e rm ittees 3 3 1
N o n p erm ittees 4 4 0
A cadem ics 7 0 0
M an ag ers 2 3 3
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts 5 0 2
Other 3 3 0
T o ta ls 24 13 6
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GENERAL REMARKS CONCERNING THE SURVEY RESULTS
Permit value is clearly only one influence among many in ranching 
politics, but an important one in the resistance of ranchers to cuts in AUM 
levels. The overall degree of that influence is debatable, and its influence on a 
rancher's politics and motivations varies from rancher to rancher. Other 
influences include the loss of year-to-year income that is the result of lost 
AUMs, ranchers' philosophical and emotional attachments to their way of life, 
the permittees' desire to be left alone by the government and the general 
public, their desire to retain open space, and other issues less often mentioned 
and perhaps less important.
The results of this survey clearly show that permit value is an element of 
the public land grazing debate that needs more attention. Both further study 
and debate over potential ways to address the issue are needed. Considering the 
results of this small survey, a larger survey is recommended, with a wider 
range of questions and clearly defined standardized answers that span a range 
of possibilities (i.e. from 1 to 5, or a similar system), that can more easily 
analyzed .
If it becomes necessary to figure out the fair market value of allotments, I 
would not recommend surveying ranchers as a method, for fear that they 
might appraise allotment value too high if compensation was a possibility. In 
fact, most of the information needed is already available. During one of the 
interviews, it emerged that the Farm Credit Service has been doing its own 
regional evaluations of permit value for at least ten years. I suspect many 
agricultural banks have also done similar surveys. These, along with the 
studies presented in Chapter Three, could be systematically combined to find 
the fair market value of allotments in different regions and under the 
management of different agencies.
Despite the diversity of opinions over these issues, there is some measure of 
agreement. Whether there is enough to find workable solutions has yet to be 
determined. Looking in more detail to the survey results, it is interesting to 
note that thirty-one of forty-three participants (72%) responded yes to either 
question 6a or 6c, and thirty-four (79%) responded either yes or maybe to one 
of the two questions. This compiled result lends itself to the conclusion that a 
properly and fairly designed compensation system could possibly get 
widespread support. One possible option for such a system, along with other 
possible grazing reform measures, will be explored in the next chapters.
CHAPTER 5 
REFORM PROPOSALS & PERMIT VALUE: 
How Well Will They Work
This chapter briefly explains some of the current reform proposals relating 
to permit value. It analyzes each proposal, in part by considering the 
conversations with the interviewees that occurred in addition to their answers 
on the survey questions, Then it considers whether each proposal could be 
implemented in a form that is acceptable to both the public land ranching and 
environmental communities. Before discussing the reform proposals, a , 
number of . other public land grazing issues are exaniined in brief, so that they 
can also be discussed, along with permit value, in relation to each reform 
proposal. This reflects a concern that grazing reform primarily directed at 
permit Value does not ignore other issues that could make it either 
unacceptable or unworkable.
THE ISSUES IN REFORMING PUBLIC LANDS GRAZING 
Ranch Viability and Local Community Economic Health
For most ranchers, ensuring the continued viability of their operations is of 
primary importance. Most do not want to see any reduction in the number of 
livestock they run, and many do not want to see reductions in the acreage 
grazed on public lands, as they think that grazing is good for the land. Many 
ranchers also want their leases to last longer than ten years, to insure the 
stability of their operations.
If one goal of reform is the cooperation of the public lands ranchers, the 
AUM reductions that are required should be done in a manner that is as least 
threatening as possible. Reductions sho,uld be made as much as possible
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through voluntary measures. Larger operators should be encouraged to 
sacrifice AUMs to provide forage for smaller operators facing reductions. If 
possible, cuts should be made to larger operators and foreign interests before 
smaller operators are cut. Where possible, efforts should be made to find 
replacement forage, whether it comes from public or private land.
Ranchers also think that ranching is socially and economically important to
(
their local communities, and point out how some economists argue that these
allotments ultimately benefit rural economies, bring in tax money, and
prevent the unemployment of up to 28,000 ranchers. These beliefs continue,
despite the studies that show the West's economy changing rapidly, with many
western communities becoming less and less dependent on the ranching 
industry. Still, in designing politically viable reforms, it is important to 
consider that the ties ranchers have to their communities are important to the
them, that these ties have existed historically, and that to varying degrees,
they remain important to the communities.
H abitat, Ecological Health, and Recreation Values
It is not the point of this work to debate whether or how destructive 
livestock grazing is, but it is important to consider how this issue effects 
possible reform. Environmentalists point to a growing body of evidence 
suggesting that the effects of grazing are serious, especially if overgrazing is
allowed. In considering grazing reform, it must be taken into account that for
most environmentalists, their primary concerns are wildlife habitat and the 
long-term ecological health of public land .. Many also highly value the
recreation potential of public lands. Environmentalists vary in the degree that
they see livestock grazing as harmful to these values. Most of them want
public land grazing to be reduced in many areas to protect these values. Some 
even maintain that all livestock should be removed from public lands.
Clearly, most ranchers are also concerned about wildlife habitat and 
ecological health, but compared to environmentalists, they generally do not 
believe that livestock grazing is nearly as destructive to these values. Many 
ranchers believed themselves to be "environmentalists," but those who do 
would generally be considered conservationists rather than preservationists, 
In general, however, ranchers focus their ecological concerns on the deer, . 
elk and fish populations—species that are hunted and fished.
Ranchers generally would allow an area to be grazed longer than 
environmentalists would before considering it Overgrazed, Environmentalists 
are more cautious about grazing levels and their effects on riparian areas. For 
reform measures to satisfy environmentalists, ranchers will have to be more 
respectful of that tendency toward caution.
Permit Value, Loans and Finance
As the previous' chapters suggest, permit value is a significant issue that 
needs to be addressed in effective grazing reform. Clearly ranchers have a 
considerable financial investment in permit value. Ranchers who have 
outstanding loans or who have little ready cash and think they might need 
loans, are even more attached to keeping their AUM levels and associated 
permit values stable.
Due to these, outstanding loans, and the official agreements that encourage 
such loans to continue, many banks are very concerned about permit values. 
Some banks have even appealed AUM reductions from allotments, and there is 
little question that some banks encourage policy makers to maintain the 
security of their loans, and the allotment system in general.
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G overn m ent F in an ces
Grazing reforms should consider the question, "Does public land grazing 
make economic sense?" Recognizing that this question is multidimensional 
and has no simple answers does not make it irrelevant. In fact, it becomes even 
more important as its complexities are examined. The question has to be put in 
different contexts. What area of the public lands is going to be considered? The 
economic issues can be looked at nationally, regionally, for small groups of 
allotments, o r . for individual allotments. To focus the issue, what really needs to 
be asked is, "From whose perspective does grazing make economic sense? From 
the ranchers'? The communities'? The governments'? The taxpayers'? The 
anglers'? The botanists'?" The answer is as varied as the perspective. To get a 
sense of these complexities, the following discussion looks briefly at the 
economics of the allotment system for the ranching industry and for the 
tax p ay er.
For the ranchers, there is little question that most of the allotments in the 
current system benefit them economically. They also point to their allotments' 
benefits to their local community from the revenue sharing system of grazing 
fee receipts, and remind us that the money their businesses bring into their 
communities needs to be considered in the economic equation. The ranching 
industry claims that ranchers need the benefits from their allotments, as they 
are faced with a variety of hardships that hit the small operators hardest, 
including the low price of beef, competition for land and forage from other 
users, and higher overhead. Many ranchers also think that the government is 
paying too much for administrating the allotment system.
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Despite the overall benefits of federal allotments for the ranching 
i n d u s t r y , s o m e  allotments are being abandoned either because of lack of 
interest or high operating costs. Even considering that during the last few 
years, grazing fees have been some of the lowest in many years, some 
allotments are expensive to maintain and of marginal economic value to 
r a n c h e r s .
Viewed from the taxpayers' perspective, there is no question that the federal 
government spends more money oh managing the allotment system than it 
brings in to the treasury. After compiling the 1993 figures from the BLM and 
Forest Service, the RR '94 DEIS found that grazing fee receipts brought in 
$28,112,000, of which $14,044,000 went into the Range Betterment Fund for 
range improvements, $5,869,000 went towards payments to states and counties, 
and only $8,172,000 went back to the US treasury (USDI, BLM 3-73). The report 
also states, "Average administration costs for the 1993 programs were 
$3.21/AUM for the BLM and $3.24 for the Forest Service" (USDI, BLM G-4). This 
puts the total administration costs for the BLM at $42,702,848 and $28,401,286 
for the Forest Service. The total administrative costs of $71,104,134 means a loss 
to the treasury of $62,932,134, and the report makes it clear that there are 
potentially other social and environmental costs that should be assessed to the 
grazing program, along with the costs of other lost uses.
Other sources have radically different estimates. Gharles Wilkinson 
estimates that the total grazing subsidy on all federal lands is about $37 million 
annually (112). Hess, Knowles, and Knowles estimate that the total costs to the 
BLM and Forest Service are closer to $150 million/year, when overhead and
"An estimate of the costs differential between permittees and nonpermittees 
suggests that nonpermittee costs were almost $105 per cow higher than 
permittee costs" (USDI, BLM 3-70).
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other miscellaneous agency costs are considered (39). Jacobs tallies the total 
tax expenditures to maintain public land grazing at over $1 billion/year, but 
he includes the cost of fire protection, roads, animal and insect control, flood 
protection and vegetation management.
It is unlikely that the disparity between these economic viewpoints will be 
settled anytime soon. Nevertheless, it is important to consider that one of the 
original reasons for charging fees was to insure that the administrative costs 
of the grazing program were covered. Clearly, any grazing reform would do 
well to insure that in the long-term, the costs and benefits to the taxpayers 
achieve some sort or parity. On the other hand, the reforms should consider 
how the allotment system assists the public lands ranchers, and focus any 
reductions to allotment AUMs so that they have as little economic impact as 
possible to those ranchers.
Further, if any grazing reform calls for significant grazing reductions, the 
money that goes to the states and counties in the form of grazing receipts 
needs to be addressed. Any reform that calls for AUM reductions is likely to be 
more acceptable to ranching communities if it includes a mechanism to 
replace grazing receipts with money from another source.
L ea sin g  R eq u irem en ts
The Forest Service and BLM both have specific requirements that dictate 
who can hold an allotment permit or lease and under what conditions. The 
Forest Service requires that their permittees have the forage and water to 
maintain their livestock during the time that their animals are not grazing on 
the allotments. They also have an upper limit to the number of AUMs that a 
permittee can hold. The BLM gives a preference for their allotments leases to 
the ranches closest to the allotment. There are some ranchers and economists
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who argue the agencies should get rid of these requirements and allow 
allotments to be exchanged more easily, so they end up attached to the ranches 
where they will be of most economic benefit. Environmentalists tend to 
believe that there should be AUM limits, but usually do not have strong 
opinions on these other issues.
Should Grazing Be Required?
The Forest Service and BLM both require that allotments be grazed. There 
are exceptions granted for drought or lack of forage. These exceptions are
generally allowed for only two or three years, but occasionally can be longer 
if circumstances warrant. There is a growing agency practice o f  giving 
allotments an extended rest, usually after negotiating with the ranchers, in 
order to restore floral and riparian health.
Currently, however, it is still illegal for an allotment holder simply to decide 
for themselves not to graze an allotment. Most environmentalists want to 
change this requirement, so that individuals or groups could lease allotments 
that they believed are important for habitat or recreation, and rest them from 
grazing. Babbitt's RR '94 would have allowed allotment holders to rest their 
allotments, but that issue was opposed by the ranching industry and is on 
appeal in the courts, having recently been ruled against in Wyoming.2 1
Clearly, this is an important issue to address in grazing reforms.
21 In the same decision, the practice of consistent understocking was ruled 
illegal by the Federal District Court of Wyoming. Public Lands Council v. 
United States Department o f Interior, 929 F. Supp 1436 (1996).
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M anagem ent R esponsib ility  and Input
Judging from the conversations with the interviewees and others, both 
ranchers and environmentalists want more input into managing grazing on 
public lands. On one hand, the ranchers often feel misjudged by the agencies' 
range specialists, believing that the officials make many of their 
recommendations after only looking at the worst conditions on their 
allotments. On the other hand, grazing activists often claimed that their 
comments are not listened to, and that their appeals of AMPs and EAs fall on 
deaf ears, thus leading to lawsuits. Although this issue is generally unrelated 
to permit value, it may be important to address in grazing reforms.
The other major debate that comes up over allotment management is the 
question of who can comment on and appeal AMPs. There is a movement in the 
ranching industry to get the law changed so that appeals would be limited to 
parties who are "affected interests," with the definition of "interest" focused 
on economic impacts. Environmentalists believe that since the grazing is on 
public land, any citizen should be able to comment on or appeal these plans.
M o n i t o r i n g / S i d e b a r s
Much like the issue of management responsibility, the reform of monitoring 
is not directly related to permit value. The level of monitoring of different 
allotments varies between the agencies and can vary extensively from region 
to region. Monitoring is an important issue to both ranchers and activists. 
Activists generally want more and better monitoring of allotments. Ranchers 
generally think that the standards that are being monitored for need to be 
much clearer and enforced more uniformly. Many want to get rid of the AUM 
number limits for allotments and base the use of allotments on these new
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monitoring standards, often termed "sidebars," that are based only on 
environm ental considerations.
The Potential for Floral Decadence
Many ranchers fear that if allotments are not grazed, the grasses will dry up 
and brown out over the season. They claim that deer and elk do not like the 
brown grasses, preferring grasses that have been grazed early in the season 
and are sprouting new green shoots. They believe that after a few years 
without grazing, the grasses will stagnate and fail to re-seed. They also believe 
that the allotments that are not grazed will become fire hazards.
Environmentalists usually dismiss these concerns as not backed by 
historical or ecological facts. They note the historical records from the 
travelers throughout the Great Plains and Rockies, before the influx of sheep
and cattle, that found tall and lush grasses. Still, if grazing reform does remove
grazing from some allotments, then the reforms should insure that these areas 
are monitored and that management options are provided that will prevent 
them from going decadent and becoming hazardous.
POSSIBLE PUBLIC LAND GRAZING REFORMS 
Fee Level Changes
Increasing grazing fees is undoubtedly the most debated grazing reform, 
and usually leads to disputes between the ranching and environmental 
communities. With grazing fees currently at S1.36/AUM, except for some of 
those who think that ranchers should be rewarded for good stewardship, there
are only a few people asking for a reduction in grazing fees. There are,
however, a number of voices calling for a fee increase as a solution to some of 
the problems with public land grazing. The possibility of a fee increase raises
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a number of questions, some hotly debated: What would a fee increase do to 
ranches? How do fee level changes affect permit value? What might a fee 
increase do for the taxpayer, or the health of the land? There is no question 
that an increase in grazing fees would cost ranchers more and reduce their 
profits. Almost everyone agrees that increasing fees would decrease both the 
desirability and permit value of allotments.
The real debate over increasing grazing fees involves whether it would 
ultimately benefit the land. Ranchers argue that as fees increase, more 
ranches will go out of business, leading to decadent grasses, and either more 
subdivisions in areas of increasing populations, or job loss and community 
disruption in areas with stable or decreasing populations. Many also believe 
that a fee increase will lead to more overgrazing, as ranchers add more 
livestock to the land in an attempt to make up for lost profits.
Environmentalists argue that increasing fees will cover more of the 
agencies' costs of managing the grazing programs, and give them more money 
for monitoring. Many also believe that fees should be raised gradually until 
permit values reach zero. Some would do this simply because they believe that 
permit value should never have existed in the first place, others because they 
think allotments benefit only a very narrow class, not even including all 
ranchers. Others think that without the additional motive of retaining permit 
values, ranchers will be less protective of their AUM levels and more willing 
to accept AUM reductions that might prevent overgrazing. They also believe 
that increasing fees would end up removing grazing from the more 
economically marginal allotments, which they believe are often the 
allotments that have already been damaged from overgrazing.
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The Domenici and Smith Bills
The recent reform efforts introduced first by Senator Domenici and then by
Representative Smith (R-OR) have also generally led to controversy, as they 
focus on insuring the security of ranches by lengthening leases to fifteen
years, limiting public input in allotment management, and making grazing 
the priority use of these public lands. Environmentalists are nearly 
unanimous in opposition to these reforms, with many angered by what they 
see as an attempt to limit the public's rights. Despite their controversial 
nature, it is important to question what these reforms would really do to the 
public land grazing system. Would they really improve the ranchers' security?
Would they improve habitat or the productivity of the land? How would longer 
leases affect permit values and property values?
If these reforms came about, it is likely that both the ranchers and the
banks would feel more secure about the stability of the allotment system and
their local communities. If the reforms generally stabilize AUM levels, then
permit and property values are likely to remain stable or even increase. With
grazing levels stable, these reforms would also reduce concerns about 
potential floral decadence, but would not do anything to change leasing or 
monitoring requirements. Additionally, since fewer people could appeal, the
taxpayers might also save money because officials would spend less time on 
appea ls .
Supporters of the bills argue that if ranchers could count on the continued 
use of their allotments at present levels, than that enhanced security would 
encourage them to take better care of the land. Many also argue that since the 
ranchers would be more protective of their forage, their efforts would work to
prevent overgrazing, thus also helping habitat. It makes sense that if these
reforms were enacted, ranchers who already have made sacrifices and
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investments to take better care of the land would then make further 
investments and continue to protect their previous investments.
Environmentalists have a different argument. They believe that although 
some cases of overgrazing take place through ignorance of good management 
practices, more often it occurs because a rancher is financially troubled. At 
times, these indebted ranchers attempt (illegally) to run even more cattle on 
allotments simply to try to pay their bills or pay off their loans. Although this 
would not happen in every case, there is nothing in these reforms to prevent 
ranchers who abused their allotments from continuing that destructive 
practice. They believe that these bills really do not protect the leaseholders 
who need it the most, and only provide them a false sense of security. In fact, 
they think these bills trap the poorer ranchers in a loose net of governmental 
Subsides, and bind their livelihood to marginal allotments. This leaves the less 
fortunate ranchers trying to eke out a living from those marginal allotments, 
with one of their biggest expenses being the loans that they took out to pay for 
both their ranches' property value and the permit value of their allotments.
Selling A llotm ents To Ranchers
One potential reform that has been suggested since the beginning of the 
allotment system is the possibility of selling off these lands. Those who suggest 
this usually would give the ranchers first preference in purchasing them. 
Some have even suggested that the allotments should be given to the ranchers, 
following the spirit and custom of the Homestead Act. Along with the previous 
set of questions raised about each reform, this possibility raises some unique 
issues: How would the price of the allotments be determined? Would the 
ranchers actually be given first preference, and if not, could corporate or
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foreign interests buy these lands? Would there be limits on development? 
Would the ranchers even buy them?
This plan clearly takes care of the issues of monitoring, management 
responsibility, and leasing requirements, because without allotments, these 
issues would disappear. With continued grazing, there would also be little 
potential for decadent grasses. If ecological costs are not considered, then this 
option would almost surely save the taxpayers some money by reducing the
costs to the agencies, and it would provide a short term income to the treasury 
from the sales. It is also a potential boon to some communities, due to an influx 
of property taxes.
Many advocates of this option have a libertarian philosophy that objects to 
having any public land. Some also believe that the ranchers would take better 
care of the land they owned, and that overall the plan would lead to significant 
improvements in ranch viability and local community economic health, along 
with better habitat and ecological health. Others, including a few 
environmentalists, simply believe it would save the taxpayers money.
Without the rules, regulations, and uncertainty of the allotment leasing 
systems, at first glance it would seem that the stability of ranches would 
increase. On further analysis, however, that may not be the case. There are 
many who believe that this plan would not work, because the ranchers either
would not be able to afford the allotments to begin with, or if they did 
purchase them, they would be strapped with both additional loans and 
additional property taxes that would add up to be significantly more than 
grazing fees. Thus the plan would actually lead to widespread ranch 
instability, or the disappearance of the small family ranch. On the other hand,
if the privatization of allotments was set up to minimize these costs to the
ranchers, than the benefits to the treasury and local communities would also 
be minimized.
In the conversations with interviewees, it became clear that all the 
environmentalists and many of the ranchers opposed the privatization of 
public land, especially if there was any chance that it would lead to developing 
these lands. Many also agreed with the results of the Reagan initiated study, 
President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, which questions whether
there would be interest in buying these public lands. Since that study, some of 
the land has increased in value, but generally for its development potential
and not fot its forage.
Environmentalists completely disagree with the analysis of this plan done 
by its supporters. They do not believe that the ranchers would take better care 
of land they owned if there was no monitoring program or means to limit 
grazing levels. They think that in many cases overgrazing would increase 
with the increased financial pressure on the ranchers. Privatization would 
also limit public access to these lands, reducing recreation options and their 
economic benefits to the communities. Left without the laws and regulations of 
the current leasing systems, some environmentalists also envision that they 
would end up relying increasingly on the Clean Water Act and the Endangered 
Species Act to protect habitat and water quality, which would create even more 
controversy as these laws would have to be applied to more private land.
Open Market Bidding For Grazing Permits
Opening up grazing permits to the highest bidder is one of the most often 
suggested grazing reforms, in part because .it 'has been or is currently being 
used in various formulations by some states, tribes, and federal agencies. These 
bidding systems vary in duration, as to whether the bids are open or closed,
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and as to what additional services are provided, but most will only allow 
ranchers’ bids to be accepted. In almost all instances, open market bidding 
brings in higher fees than the current fees of the BLM and Forest Service. 
Exceptions exist in areas where there is little competition for the allotment or 
if the allotment is in poor condition.
If a bidding system was implemented, a number of issues would have to be
settled: Who could bid? Would subleasing be allowed? What type of monitoring
system would be put in place? Who would pay for the improvements that
ranchers previously invested in for their allotments? Would the ranchers who
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currently have their allotments get some sort of preference in the bidding 
process? Would permit value be compensated for in any way? For both 
ranchers or environmentalists, how the bidding system was set up would make 
a big difference in their evaluations as to whether to support or oppose it.
The public land ranchers are unlikely to support instituting a bidding 
system unless the leases were for multiple years, and the ranchers who 
previously leased the allotment were compensated for both their 
improvements and their investment in its permit value. Even then, many 
would likely believe that a bidding system would detract from their industry's 
and communities' security. They might be more likely to support bidding for 
allotments currently are not being leased, or if bidding was instituted for a 
ranch's allotments only after the ranch was sold. Generally ranchers are also 
opposed to having allotments bid on if the bidder does not intend to graze 
them, especially if the allotments are currently being grazed.
Environmentalists generally support instituting a bidding system over the 
current allotment system. They think that it would bring in more income, 
allowing the allotment system to pay for itself. They also believe that whether 
or not ranchers were initially compensated for it, a bidding system would get
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rid of permit value. Further, without permit value it is likely that a bidding 
system would lead to less opposition by ranchers if AUM reductions were called 
for, in part because reductions could be implemented between bidding cycles 
and because the ranchers would have less financial stake in maintaining
I  ' .
allotment levels. Activists also support more frequent bidding cycles, because 
more cycles would allow the agencies to re-evaluate grazing levels more often.
Free Market Bidding For Variable Use Allotm ents
There is a growing debate on few proposals that would not only open up
allotments for competitive bidding, but would also Open them up to different 
types of uses. One possible new use is simply resting the allotment, but various 
options include giving the leasee varying degrees of priority use of the 
allotment for camping, hiking, fishing, hunting, other recreation activities, 
plant gathering and even building and using a few (temporary?) structures.
These options drop specific leasing requirements for cattle grazing, but 
develop new requirements that limit the activities oh the allotments, and in 
theory require responsible stewardship from the leasee. Most of the proposals . 
give the primary management responsibility to the leasee. They base the 
agencies' monitoring system for the allotments on some type of sidebar 
requirements. This system would allow ranchers to run more cattle than their 
current permits allow, as long as the sidebar, monitoring standards were met.
Options also vary as to the length of the leases, but most would increase it to 
fifteen or twenty years. Proposals also vary as to whether and how previous 
leasees might get compensation for their allotments' improvements and permit 
value. Most everyone agrees that free market variable use allotments would 
bring in considerably more income for the government. Its proponents 
usually project a somewhat reduced cost to the agencies, as they would not
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have to develop AMPs, but would have the costs from developing the initial 
sidebars. Skeptics of the new system believe that developing these sidebars 
would be complicated and costly, and that it would actually increase the 
management complexity and costs to the agencies.
As the specific proposals vary, so do the reactions to them, and the 
expectations as to their consequences for both ranch viability and ecologically 
related concerns. Reactions to these types of proposals also seem mixed among 
both the ranching and environmental communities. Concerns about what 
types of uses would be allowed, economic issues, sidebar development, and 
management implementation come from both sectors. Proponents with 
projections of positive financial benefits, less government intrusion, and 
healthier ecosystems come from within both communities and from others. It 
is my suspicion that government managers would not be happy about having 
to implement any of these proposals.
G r a s s b a n k i n g
Gras shanking is a new management tool that the agencies have begun to 
test. It can be used in conjunction with various other reform measures. 
Grassbanking allows temporary grazing on unused allotments, to replace 
forage from allotments that are being rested to benefit ecological and riparian 
health. This allows the ranchers with allotments that are being rested to
maintain their AUM levels at or near their previous levels. Sometimes the use
of a grassbank allotment is given to the rancher after a rest is required, and 
sometimes it is used as a tool to negotiate a voluntary rest.
Since resting allotments comes through an agency decision, it does not
actually change the legal requirement that allotments be grazed. Nor does it
affect leasing or monitoring requirements. It is, however, a tool that allows
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flexibility in management. It can be suggested by environmentalists, 
ranchers, or the agencies, thus encouraging management responsibility by 
all parties. Also, as AUM levels remain generally stable, grassbanking has 
little effect on government finances.
Ranchers generally approve of grassbanking as a tool that maintains ranch 
viability and local economic health, while also improving habitat. Since it 
works to maintain stable AUM levels, they think that it helps maintain permit 
values. They also believe that it reduces the possibility of floral decadence, 
because it prevents allotments from going completely without grazing.
 ̂ Environmentalists have mixed opinions about grassbanking. Although it 
encourages the resting of allotments that need restoration, many do not like 
the fact that previously abandoned allotments are returned to grazing, thus 
preventing what they predict would be the return to a totally natural state. On 
the other hand, they realize that some of these allotments could be legally 
returned to full grazing in any case, and tend to support grassbanking in 
those instances.
Compensation For Forced AUM Reduction
The acceptability of compensating ranchers for forced AUM reductions has 
already been discussed in the last chapter, but could it be successfully 
implemented and how does it relate to the other issues that come up in grazing 
reform? If such a compensation system were to be set up, two additional 
questions would have to be answered: "How would compensation levels be set?" 
and "Could the money be raised?"
When determining the amount ranchers would get compensated for each 
lost AUM, in order to save on administrative costs, and to prevent disputes, it 
should be done in a manner that is as a simple and clear as possible. Individual
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assessments of allotment permit values would surely be expensive and 
inconsistent. Individual assessments also make allotments look more like 
property, and would thus reinforce the belief that the compensation is for 
some kind of taking (of the right to a grazing permit). Any compensation that 
could be viewed as a taking would almost universally be opposed by 
env i r onme n t a l i s t s .  '
To avoid these problems, the compensation would need to be written into law 
as a transitional fund, to provide either for alternative forage, or replacement 
^income. Consider the simple method of setting compensation at a uniform 
level, say $75 for seasonal AUMs and $125 for year-long AUMs. These 
suggestions are at the higher end of studied permit values, but setting them 
high would make the program more acceptable to ranchers.
It could also make sense to set compensation levels through a clear formula. 
This might start at a lower level that was modified by a rancher's level of 
dependence on federal allotments. For example, $50 for seasonal AUMs plus $50 
multiplied by the percent level of dependence would work out to $60 for 20% 
dependence and $90 for 80% dependence. A similar system could be set up that 
had one base level that was modified to take account for the exact length of the 
season of use for the allotment. A formula could even be developed that took 
into account both dependency levels and the season of use.
An acceptable compensation system also needs to set aside money to 
compensate the states or counties for lost grazing receipts. With the current 
fee. level of $1.36/AUM, that would be 680/AUM for BLM allotments outside of 
grazing districts, 170/AUM for BLM allotments inside grazing districts, and 
340/AUM for Forest Service allotments. To make up for this, $10 invested at an 
annual interest rate of 6.8% would earn 680/AUM per year, $5 would earn 
340/AUM, and $2.50 would earn 170/AUM. Each of these figures is relatively
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insignificant compared to the money going to the rancher. It might also make 
sense to allow the state or county to take complete control of that fund after 
perhaps ten years.
How much money would it take to compensate for all forced AUM reductions? 
That of course depends on what reductions were required. Even under the 
Livestock Production Alternative in RR '94 DEIS, the agencies were expected to 
decrease total AUMs by approximately 2.4 million over the next 20 years. For 
quick figuring, assume the average compensation to be about $100/AUM, so 
those reductions would require $240 million or $12 million/year. The 
Environmental Enhancement Alternative in the RR '94 DEIS would have 
required a total decrease of approximately 6.7 million AUMs, so those 
reductions would require $670 million or $33.5 million/year. For this 
investigation, perhaps it would be best, to use the figures for the Proposed 
Action of the RR '94 DEIS, with a 4.6 million AUM reduction over 20 years, 
requiring $23 m illion/year.2 2
To put these figures for the program in perspective, one could look briefly 
at the costs of the Conservation Reserve Program. That program is designed to 
protect environmentally sensitive lands and erosive soils. This year the USDA 
accepted 5.9 million new acres into the Conservation Reserve Program at \
$45.15 per acre (Montana Grain Growers). Just this new acreage will cost the
program $266 million per year. The current total in program is 29.9 million
acres, and although the acreage for last year was enrolled at $39.39, the total 
cost of the program is still close to $1 billion per year.
22 The Livestock Production Alternative reduction of 2.4 million is 
approximately 11% of the BLM and Forest Service total of 22 million. The 
Environmental Enhancement Alternative reduction of 6.7 million is 
approximately 30%, and the Proposed Action reduction of 4.6 million is
approximately 21%.
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Before finally looking at where this money would come from, it is important 
to look at what effects forced compensation has on other reform issues. 
Compared to current management, it would generally stabilize the ranching 
industry and communities, because it could be set up to maintain revenues 
from grazing receipts and gives some money to the ranchers for replacement 
forage. Many ranchers will still argue that replacement forage is not 
available, or that the compensation is not enough to pay for replacement 
forage in the long term. While that might be true in some cases, those 
ranchers might consider simply reducing their herds and putting that money 
in the bank or investing it. If they were compensated $1,200 for a 12 AUM 
reduction (enough to. feed one cow and a calf for a year) at 6.8% annual 
interest, they would bring in $81.60, which is comparable to the average 
annual profits from one cow.
If there was compensation for forced AUMs, permit values would generally 
stabilize to a level close to the level of compensation, again stabilizing the 
ranching industry arid increasing the security of the financial community 
that loans them money. If fee levels remain stable, forced compensation would
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initially cost the agencies more because fee receipts would go down and the
compensation money would be added to the budget. However, some
management costs, include money spent on appeals, lawsuits, improvements 
and monitoring, would go down, and in the long term, after grazing levels
stabilized, the total costs to the agencies would go down.
Under a forced compensation system, leasing requirements, management 
responsibility, monitoring requirements and the requirement to graze would 
not be greatly affected. Although reductions would be required, few allotments 
would end up without any grazing, so there would be little concern over the 
potential for floral decadence. Debate would continue as to what level of
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reductions were necessary to deal with the effects of overgrazing; protect 
habitat, and maintain recreation values, but it is likely that resistance to AUM 
reductions would go down.
So, where would the compensation money come from? Probably from a 
combination Of sources. Money from private and nonprofit sources is one 
possibility. Some of the money could come from a surcharge on grazing fees. 
Fifty cents per AUM . would initially raise over $10 million per year. Although a 
surcharge would encounter initial resistance, it is likely to lessen as the 
ranchers realize that such an increase is much like allotment insurance, and 
that all the money is returning to public lands ranchers. The money saved 
from appeals, lawsuits and eventual reductions in the agencies’ personnel and 
monitoring budgets should also be filtered into the compensation program. 
Some of the compensation money should be tied to the reasons for the 
reductions. If reductions are required for deer or elk forage, or to protect fish
habitat or an endangered species, they could be funded from the various Fish
*
and Wildlife Agencies' budgets or other money designated for protecting 
endangered species. Finally, perhaps the most likely source would be from an 
amendment to the Land and Water Conservation Fund,
V oluntary A llo tm en t R etirem ent
The acceptability of compensating ranchers for voluntarily retiring their 
allotments has been discussed in the previous chapter, but it also raises
• s .
questions as to if and how it might be successfully implemented. The answers 
to the questions of compensation levels and sources are similar to those of 
forced reductions, but the voluntary compensation plan affects some of the 
other management issues very differently. This system also raises some 
different questions. How many ranchers would actually take advantage of it,
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and what would happen if more ranchers wanted to retire allotments than
there was money available? Also, would the agencies have veto power over
allotment retirement, and could an allotment ever be grazed again, even if it
was not actually leased as part of the allotment system?
There is little doubt that the agencies would have to develop rules that 
prioritized which types of allotments they would fund first for retirement. 
These priorities might include allotments that are expensive to monitor and 
manage, or those in priority habitat or heavily used recreation areas, or those
without AMPs. I suspect that the agencies would want to keep open the option ■
of putting some of the allotments that got retired into a grassbanking system, 
in order to alleviate overgrazing on neighboring allotments. A voluntary 
retirement system would also more likely be acceptable if the owners of
ranches who wanted to retire their allotments were required to make a 
commitment to limit the subdivision of their private land.
This system would not change leasing or monitoring requirements, but
would obviously end the requirement that grazing continue for the retired 
allotments. It would also change the agencies' management responsibility, 
since the monitoring requirements for retired allotments would change to 
include preventing the potential for floral decadence.
Any voluntary reduction system should also include a fund to replace 
grazing receipts similar to the one discussed previously. The money for 
voluntary allotment retirement is much more likely to come from private and 
nonprofit sources. In many cases, states, counties and cities would benefit 
from the retirement of certain allotments and would conceivably help finance 
their retirement, as would some federal agencies besides the Forest Service and 
BLM, if it benefited their goals. If it were allowed, both the BLM and Forest. 
Service would undoubtedly help finance the retirement of problem allotments,
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but certainly not to the extent that they would finance forced reductions, 
unless Congress voted additional money to the program.
Although it would probably benefit the agencies to have a clear and 
consistent compensation level along the lines of those discussed in the 
previous section, for other federal agencies, other governmental bodies, and 
for private interests, the compensation levels negotiated for allotment 
retirement would vary considerably, depending on the goals of the both the 
ranchers and those who fund the retirement. If retirement became 
widespread, than permit values are likely to at least stabilize at their current 
levels, if not increase, which would also please both ranching communities 
and their banks.
Overall, a voluntary retirement system should improve ranch viability and
local community health, because the least economical ranches would most
• . <■ 
likely be retired first. Additionally, it could generally improve habitat,
ecological health, and recreation opportunities, along with creating new
economic opportunities.
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: 
Any Grazing Reform Must Deal With Permit Value
THE EXISTENCE AND INFLUENCE OF PERMIT VALUE
As the evidence from the previous chapters indicates, there is really no 
debate over the existence of permit value. It can be documented historically, 
starting soon after the creation of the allotment system and continuing into 
the present. It is recognized by the Internal Revenue Service and the Farm 
Credit Administration. It has been documented by economists, both in theory 
and practice, through surveys and modeling of ranch real estate values: It is 
also almost universally recognized by anyone familiar with the allotment 
system .
There is still debate, however, oyer the importance and influence of permit
Value. It clearly has practical significance, as most ranchers expect to recoup
their investment in permit value if they decide to sell their ranch. Since it is
taxed as an inheritance, it can also play a part in whether a rancher's heirs
will continue ranching or sell the ranch, For individual ranchers, permit
value is widely variable in its direct impacts. For ranchers who do not intend
to sell their ranches and are not threatened by AUM cuts, it is effectively
nonexistent. For others, that is far from the truth. As one historian points out:
Many ranchers take almost continuous non-use for a significant part of 
their permitted numbers, but fiercely resist all suggestions that these 
excessive numbers (which they know to be excessive) be cut, because of 
their desire to retain the potential sale value of the larger permits.
(Calif 274)
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For ranchers who are faced with AUM reductions and recognize that they may 
sell their ranches at some point or if their allotments are used as collateral, 
permit value can be extremely significant in their decision-making.
The level of direct impacts of permit value on a specific rancher does not 
necessarily directly translate into the level of political significance it has for 
that rancher. A rancher may not even have an allotment, but might still 
support maintaining grazing levels and permit values at their current levels. 
Alternately, a few ranchers dependent on allotments threatened by reductions 
may still support reforms that reduce the importance of permit value. Non­
ranchers, including bankers, environmentalists, and taxpayers in general, 
also have a wide range of opinions about permit value that affect their 
political stance on managing public lands.
The results of the survey undertaken for this thesis indicate that the 
political importance of permit value varies. Its political influence is reflected 
in the extent it increases the resistance of ranchers to reductions in their 
AUM levels. By extension, the extent that ranchers and their supporters 
attempt to use their political influence to maintain their AUM levels and 
permit value also varies. The extent that permit value affects ranchers politics
is not something that can be determined in any absolute or completely '
objective manner, but clearly it has some influence, and that influence is
potentially of great importance.
It can also be argued that in politics, an issue that is extremely important to
: - 1
a small sector often becomes an important influence to policy makers. If that 
is the case, considering that permit value is a major motivating factor for some 
ranchers (and bankers) then that influence is at least significant, and 
potentially a major factor in the politics of the management of public land 
g ra z in g .
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PERMIT VALUE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ANY REFORM PROPOSALS
Permit value is clearly an important enough issue that it should be 
considered, and hopefully dealt with, in any attempts to reform the public land 
grazing allotment system. In general, reforms that would reduce the total 
permit value without compensation should expect opposition from the 
ranching community. Reforms that reduce permit value through
f
compensation can expect favorable but mixed reviews and some reluctant 
support from both environmentalists and from the public lands ranchers. 
Reforms (or the current status quo) that leave the total level of permit values 
generally unchanged can expect support from the public land ranchers, but 
opposition from, environmentalists. All of these options are likely to receive 
mixed reviews from other sectors
,.A politically acceptable reform is likely to have several of the following 
characteristics. The reform should be as simple and clear as possible, so it is 
understood by all the parties affected and leaves little room for 
misinterpretation. It should strike a good balance between the goals of 
ranchers and environmentalists; although it might not be the favorite of 
everyone, it should have little outright opposition. It should foster continued 
and broader communication between the different groups concerned with the 
grazing system. It should increase management options. Finally, it should 
work as a gradual social evolution with slow but consistent changes, and not 
force the issues quickly.
Another critical factor to consider in a grazing reform proposal is how those 
proposing and supporting it would be perceived by their peers. The issue of 
grazing on public lands has been in dispute for over one hundred years, with 
the driving forces in the dispute often led by those with the most extreme 
views. A few have become completely hardened in their views and will always
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refuse to compromise. For’ many others, although not complete absolutists, any 
compromise would be difficult at best. For some individuals, supporting any 
compromise could mean losing the support of their friends and neighbors— 
losing face. For some organizations, it could mean losing members or financial 
su pport.
The ranching and environmental communities both have distinct, core, but 
related positions that need to remain uncompromised to allow any negotiations 
to proceed, artd for the participants to save face. Though hard-core
environmentalists will resist any reform that further subsidizes or 
compensates the ranchers, for those willing to compromise, the line is drawn 
at reform that makes grazing into a right, or that sets up allotments so that 
they are subject to takings claims. The hard-core ranchers will resist any
reform that removes any land from the allotment system, but for those willing
to compromise, the line is drawn at any reform that removes land from the 
system without some form of compensation.
It often appears that these positions are irreconcilable, and in practice, it 
might be impossible to find an acceptable compromise. The two reforms 
systems discussed previously that set up compensation systems without setting 
up any new rights to grazing or allotments are clearly on the fence between 
the two extremes. For some environmentalists, it really would not make much 
difference that the compensation money for forced reductions is for 
"transitional forage" or "transitional income." They will still consider it too
much like a taking. If is it stated properly, the courts, on the other hand, are
. ' r>,
unlikely to consider a transitional allocation much of a precedent to bolster 
other takings claims! It would be more like food stamps or unemployment 
insurance. Although such a system might seem to play into the hands of the 
ranchers, and satisfy all but the hard-core, the ranchers are still making a
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"hidden" concession, since compensation systems would almost certainly make 
it much more difficult to fight AUM reductions with economic arguments, 
either in the courts or with the agencies.
A politically negotiated agreement between the ranching and 
environmental communities would clearly take some compromise. Having 
considered the "bottom line" positions, the other important element to consider
in bargaining is the real goals of each group. Although more than a few 
environmentalists want to get rid of ranching on public lands, the more 
common goal is to reduce ranching's impacts to order to improve the health of 
the land. Similarly, although more than a few ranchers want to make public 
land grazing a permanent right, the more common goals is to insure their 
economic viability 'and their way of life. Can both of these goals be reached in
some agreement, even if it does not satisfy the absolutists?
Perhaps they can, as talk of different proposals for new types of grazing
reforms appears to be increasing, and many proposals include some type of
. i
compensation scheme. (See Appendixes C and D.) If this talk was coming only 
from environmentalists, it probably would not be very significant, but it is 
also being heard ,from some ranchers, and also from some politicians whose 
main focus is cutting the budget. Despite these rumblings, it would still be a 
surprise if the issue gets much attention by the general public, but these ideas 
are gaining the attention of environmentalists and land-use groups. It is 
between these groups that the real debate is beginning to take shape, and 
where it needs to take place, if these new options that prioritize the 
consideration of permit value are to change the ongoing political debate over 
grazing on public lands.
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A HYBRID SOLUTION
In the light of the influence of permit value and the often conflicting 
interests of the environmental and ranching communities, what 
recommendations can be given to the policy makers that might conceivably be 
politically acceptable? The option favored by the author incorporates a
number of tradeoffs and includes some of the options discussed earlier. It
focuses on gradually reducing the influence of permit value without undue 
economic impacts on the part of the ranchers. It also recognizes the 
importance of the current national trend towards lowering the total AUMs in 
the allotment system, and that this trend is expected to continue. It is 
fundamentally based on a combination of the tw o-plans that compensate
ranchers for forced AUM reductions and for the voluntary retirement of
a llo tm en ts .
The compensation for forced AUM reductions (that are not due to 
overgrazing) appears to be grudgingly favored by both ranchers and 
environmentalists, although to some degree more by the ranchers. In the 
hybrid plan the rancher would be compensated unless there was evidence to 
show that the rancher had violated the agency proscribed AUM level or season 
of use on their allotment more than once in the previous five years. 
Compensation would . also not be given to foreign-owned ranches or ranchers 
who refused to sign their AMPs or any other required contract with the 
agencies. The amount of compensation should be such that a prudent investor 
could replace the lost income from the sale of their livestock, based on the 
average sale price of livestock in their state for the previous five years. The 
money to finance this should come in part from the government’s expected 
savings, in part from the Land and Water Conservation Fund and in part from 
the 500 surcharge on allotments discussed previously.
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The other major element of this hybrid proposal is a voluntary retirement 
system that is not funded by either ranchers or (except in unusual 
circumstances) by the federal government.2 3 The retirement could be funded 
by state or local governments, nonprofit groups or private interests, when it is 
in there interest to do so. There would be no specific amount required per AUM
for voluntary retirement, except the requirement that a fund be established to
replace the amount of the fee that was going to the state or county. The system 
for voluntary retirement need not be rigid. Following are some suggestions 
that would allow more flexibility in retirement arraignments.
The voluntary allotment system could also be set up to allow for some 
allotment trading as part of the process. For instance, if a rancher was ready to 
retire, but had an allotment without prized habitat, and a nearby rancher still 
wanted to ranch, but his allotment was coveted by environmentalists for its 
fish habitat, trading would allow the first rancher to retire with 
compensation, the second to continue ranching, and the environmentalists to 
protect the habitat they consider most important.
A retirement contract might also incorporate a provision that stated to what 
degree the allotment could be used as part of a grassbanking system. A 
rancher might be more willing to put an allotment in semi-retirement, where
it could be used every second or third year at half its previous level as part of a
grassbanking system. The agencies could use that extra forage to rest other 
allotments, or put it up for bid. Such an agreement should designate the money 
from auctioned forage to the forced reduction compensation fund.
Part of a retirement agreement might also be combined with putting an 
easement on the private part of the land, or some limit on the extent that it
23 It might occur if an agency decides that it is cheaper to pay for an 
allotment's retirement than it would be to do the monitoring, range 
improvements and paperwork for that allotment.
113
could be subdivided. This could be used to prevent ranch owners who were
about to "sell-out" to developers from making additional money. The agencies
would have the decision-making power for allotments abandoned without such
an agreement (by the developer or others). These allotments could be rested, 
retired, traded, put in a grassbanking system, or allotted through competitive 
bidding, thus preventing them from regaining permit value.
Another trade-off might ease the restrictions whereby sm all' (perhaps 640 
acres or less) and entirely enclosed allotments could be sold or traded to 
ranchers, after public comment and agreement by the agencies. This would
give the ranchers some assurance that their investments and general ranch
structure could be maintained and improved.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE REFORM
Considering the surprising range of viewpoints of both ranchers and 
environmental activists found in the interviews, it is likely that the debate 
over possible new reforms is unlikely to fall along the traditional lines. It is
likely that those with the most extreme viewpoints will reject any new
management option that smells of compromise. Since these elements are often
the most vocal on both sides, any acceptable reform will have to have good 
support from those who are less extreme, and some of these "centrists" will 
have to take on vocal roles to educate others on the implications of these 
re fo rm s.
Still, even some of the not-so-extreme environmentalists are likely to look at
' the "hybrid" proposal above and initially reject it as overly generous to the
ranchers. Before doing so, however, they should seriously consider the 
"hidden" concession mentioned earlier. If this proposal or some other 
compensation plan is put into effect, without any other changes to
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environmental laws, then some of the main arguments that ranchers use to 
resist cuts in grazing levels would be undermined. That undercutting is likely 
to lead many ranchers to resist the proposal. One would no longer find sections 
of environmental impact statements that declared that management options 
that required AUM cuts would cause significant impacts to the ranchers and 
their local communities. Ranchers often argue that these changes will, "Put us 
out of business," or "Take away our way of life." With a voluntary retirement 
option that allowed for allotment trading, the ranchers going out of business 
would almost exclusively be those who are ready to retire anyway. Indeed, 
there would still be ranchers who have to reduce the numbers they run, but if 
there was compensation for forced reductions, most, if not all of their income 
would be replaced.
With compensation measures in place, undoubtedly the agencies, the courts, 
the public and the lawmakers would look at the ranching community with less 
sympathy when reacting to situations that apparently placed wildlife habitat 
or water quality ahead of a rancher’s livelihood or the local community's 
economy. Compensation measures not only move public lands away from use 
for grazing and towards other uses, they also make environmental laws more 
effective by reducing their conflicts with economic considerations.
So why would any rancher buy into a system that one rancher describes as, 
"A sugar-coated cyanide pill?" Why would they accept a plan that might reduce 
their political influence and increase the effectiveness of environmental 
laws? For those who believe that grazing rarely or never causes 
environmental impacts or even improves the land, or who philosophically 
oppose seeing any land that is grazed go to other uses, then it is likely that 
there is no argument that will influence them. For some, however, the 
economic arguments that come with compensation make sense. Even if the
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compensation is not actually for a taking, they are still getting what many 
have been arguing in favor of for years: compensation for AUM reductions.
For others, who have been entrenched with environmentalists and the 
agencies for years, if not decades, it provides the light at the end of the tunnel. 
There is already a growing movement, including the BLM's Resource Advisory 
Councils and other private groups, towards negotiating these conflicts rather 
than continuing to battle in court. For the ranchers who prefer to spend their 
time ranching, rather than on law or politics, compensation plans are a path
y  ■
towards opening up communication and towards resolving these . long-time 
co n flic ts .
Other ranchers see the changing social patterns that could ultimately erode
their base of resistance to these changes. The ranching community is aging,
and not as many in the next generations are willing to take over the ranch.
Population is increasing, and ranchers are selling out, and with that increase
comes more interest in using public land for recreation—and water. They see 
‘ * 
that if public land ranching is to continue, it will have to evolve. Some of these
plans allow for that evolution, without bringing financial ruin to the
ranching com m unity.
The last reason that ranchers might be willing to accept these types of plans
is that the public land ranchers have been gradually losing a war of attrition
with environmentalists in the judicial system. There are good reasons that
NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water Act sound like dirty
words to ranchers, as environmental groups are effectively using these laws
in court to reduce grazing levels, especially in the Southwest.
Those victories bring on the question from some environmentalists, "We're
winning. Why should we stop now?" They see that a solution that incorporates
compensation, although possibly leading to significantly reduced grazing
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levels, would not lead to its abolition. After reductions are made on the most J
environmentally sensitive lands, it is likely to be harder to reduce grazing
levels further, either politically or through the courts. Also, their focus would 
have to change towards raising money to lure more ranchers into potential
voluntary retirement, and many have philosophical disagreements with 
primarily having to raise funds, as they believe that in doing so they will have 
to "buy into the system."
These environmentalists often do not step back to recognize how these 
victories in the courts, although significant, have come slowly, at great costs, 
and without real guarantees that the courts, the agencies, or the lawmakers 
might someday sweep them away. Victories of that nature actually work to 
increase the political resistance of the ranching community. They fail to see, 
or do not believe, that lasting change is more likely to come with a solution 
that is acceptable to all the parties concerned.
As with many of the reform measures discussed in this work, the
implementation of the hybrid solution would take an act of Congress.
Particularly given the current configuration of the Congress, that calls for a
note of caution. In discussing two other possible reform measures, Larry Tuttle
eloquently frames the problem:
If [Senator] Wyden were to introduce the Plan as has been suggested, 
what real control would he be able to exercise? Wyden has neither the
disposition nor the power base to exercise control over amendments or
mark-ups, unlike [Senator] Domenici, who has the disposition and power 
and a long involvement in grazing issues.
The Congress is made up of individuals with a wide variety of political beliefs
and motivations, may of whom have little personal interest in public land
grazing. The legislative process is also rife with tradeoffs and rarely passes
legislation as introduced. With pro-grazing congressmen currently
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controlling the land use committees, there is little doubt that they would use 
their influence to make changes in any legislation that did not please them.
With these political realities in mind, it is recommended that no reform 
measure be introduced to Congress without general support from both the 
ranching and environmental communities. Also, it is recommended that the 
legislation introduced be as simple as possible, so that any changes made in the 
legislative process are easily noticed and thus easily debated by both sides.
SUM M ARY
This work looks at the permit value of public land grazing allotments 
historically, legally, economically, politically, and through a survey of 
interested parties. It finds that permit value clearly exists, has some political 
significance to most ranchers and great political important to a few, and that it 
should be an issue of concern in any attempt to reform public land grazing. It 
examines what elements might be important in order to find reforms that 
might be acceptable to both the ranching and environmental communities, 
reviews other issues that could be important for potential reforms and then 
analyzes a number of possible reforms for their potential political viability.
Finally, it offers a reform package that the author believes might be 
acceptable to both of those communities. That package, however, comes with a 
number of caveats: that there is no reform that is acceptable to all sides, that 
any reform should be carefully considered and introduced into Congress with 
extreme caution, and that prior to introduction the reform should have 
significant support of both contingencies, since Congress regularly makes 
significant changes to legislation that is introduced. Despite these caveats, 
grazing reform directed at reducing the influence of permit value should be 
u n d e r ta k e n .
1 18
WORKS CITED
American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers. The Appraisal o f Rural Property. 
Chicago: American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1983.
Barlett, E. Tom, Larry Van Tassell, Neil R. Rimbey, and Allen Torell. 
"Recommendations from the 1993 Grazing Fee Study." R angelands  
16 (1994): 52-54.
Barnes, Will C. Western Grazing Grounds and Forest Ranges. Chicago: The 
Breeder's Gazette, 1913.
Borman, Michael M, and Douglas E. Johnson. "Evolution of Grazing and Land 
Tenure Policies on Public Lands," Rangelands 12 (1990): 203-206.
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 10 S.Ct. 305 (1890).
Burgess, Jeff. The Rangeland Retirement Act: A Proposal fo r  Real Rangeland
R e fo rm . h ttp ://tfo jan .n e ta .co m /~ jb u rg ess/re fo rm .h tm l.
Calif, Wesley. Private Grazing and Public Lands. University, of Chicago Press, 
1960.
Cawley, R. McGreggor. Federal Land, Western Anger: The Sagebrush Rebellion 
and Environmental Politics. University Press of Kansas, 1993.
Clawson, Marion. The Bureau o f Land Management. New York: Praeger, 1971.
Clawson, Marion. The Western Range Livestock Industry. New York: McGraw
Hill, 1950.
Culhane, Paul J. Public Lands Politics: Interest Group Influence on, the Forest 
Service and the Bureau o f Land Management. Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University, 1981. •
Dagget, Dan. Beyond the Rangeland Conflict: Towards a West that Works.
Layton, Utah: Gibbs-Smith, 1995.
Feedstuffs 12 June 1995: 1-2.
Feedstuffs 30 December 1996: 8.
Ferguson, Denzel and Nancy Ferguson. Sacred Cows at the Public Trough.
Bend, OR: Maverick, 1983.
Foss, Phillip O. Politics and Grass. Seattle: University of Washington, 1960.
Fowler, John M., and James R. Gray. Market Values o f Federal Grazing Permits 
in New Mexico. Las Cruces: Cooperative Extension of New Mexico State 
University, 1980.
Ganzel, Richard. "Ideology and the Politics of Public Lands." Federal Lands 
Policy. Ed. Phillip O. Foss. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. 33-48.
1 1 9
Gardner, B. Delworth. "Transfer Restrictions and Misallocation in Grazing 
Public Range." Journal o f Farm Economics 44 (1962): 50-64.
Gee, C. Kerry, Linda A. Joyce, and Albert G. Madsen. Factors Affecting the 
Demand fo r Grazing Forage in the U.S. Technical Report RM-210. Fort 
Collins, CO: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 1992.
Gee, C. Kerry, J. Bret Keffeler, and Albert G. Madsen. How Much is a Colorado 
Ranch Worth? Colorado Experiment Station No. 992. Fort Collins, CO:
Colorado State University, 1980.
Hage, Wayne. Storm Over Rangelands: Private Rights in Federal Lands. 3rd ed. 
Bellevue, WA: Free Enterprise Press, 1989. ^
Henson, Arnold R. "Protecting Legal Collateral." Letter to the editor. USA Today 
August 1996.
Hess, Karl Jr. and Jerry L. Holechek. "Beyond the Grazing Fee: Ah Agenda for 
Rangeland Reform." Policy Analysis 13 July 1995.
Hess, Karl Jr., Knowles, Craig and Pamela Knowles. "Reforming the Western 
Range." D ifferent Drummer Spring 1994: 2-61.
Holechek, Jerry L. "Policy Changes on Federal Rangelands: a Perspective." 
Journal o f Soil and Water Conservation 48 (1993): 166-174.
Holechek, Jerry and Karl Hess, Jr. "Grazing Lands: Prices, Value, and the 
Future." Rangelands 18 (1996): 102-105.
© Holechek, Jerry and Karl Hess, Jr. "Market Forces Would Benefit U.S.
Rangelands." Forum fo r  Applied Research and Public Policy W inter 1996:
5-15.
"House Passes Grazing Bill with Small Fee Increase." Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly. 55 (1997): 2676.
Iqbal, Muzaffar. "Determinants of Federal Land Grazing Permit Values and
Dependent Livestock Ranch Values in Eastern Oregon and Nevada." Diss.
Oregon State University, 1993.
Jacobs, Lynn. Waste o f the West: Public Lands Ranching. Tucson, AZ: Lynn 
Jacobs, 1991.
"Joint Conference with Forest Service Officials." American Cattle Producer 16 
(1935): 22.
Kerr, Andy. "The Voluntary Retirement Option for Federal Public Land Grazing 
Permittees." Unpublished article. Available from the Larch Company, 
Joseph, OR.
Kincaid, M. E. "The Income Potential Versus Market Value of New Mexico 
Ranches, 1986- 1992." M.S. Thesis. New Mexico State University, 1993.
1 2 0
Kittredge, William. "Free Range: The War Over Grazing Fees." The New Republic 
13 December 1993: 16-17.
Libecap, Gary D. Locking Up the Range: Federal Land Controls and Grazing. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1981.
Light v. United States 31 S.Ct. 485 (1911).
Martin, William E. and Gene L. Jefferies. "Relating Ranch Prices and Grazing 
Permit Values to Ranch Productivity." Journal o f Farm Economics. 4 8 
(1966): 233-242.
Montana Grain Growers Association. "5.9 Million New Acres Accepted Into 
Conservation Reserve." Montana Grain News. 4 February 1998: 1-2.
Nelson, Robert H. ""Economic Analysis in Public Ranchland Management." 
Western Public Lands: The Management o f Natural Resources in a Time of 
Declining Federalism. Ed. John G. Francis and Richard Ganzel. Totowa, New 
Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984.
Obermiller, Frederick W. Costs Incurred by Permittees in Grazing Cattle on 
Public and Private Rangelands and Pastures in Eastern Oregon: 1982 and 
1990. Special Report 903. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Extension 
Service, 1992.
Obermiller, Frederick and David Lambert. Costs Incurred by Permittees in 
Grazing Livestock on Public Lands in Various Western States. Corvallis, OR: 
Oregon State University Extension Services, 1984.
Omaechevarria v. Idaho 38 S.Ct. 323 (1918).
Oppenheimer, Harold L. Cowboy Economics: Rural Land as an Investment. 
Danville, Illinois: The Interstate, 1966.
Oregon Natural Desert Association et al. v. Jack Ward Thomas 
D.C. OR 94-522-HA. 26 September 1996.
Power, Thomas. Lost Landscapes and Failed Economics. Washington DC: Island, 
1996.
President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, Department of Interior Task 
Force. President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: Report on the 
Department o f Interior, Report on the Department o f Justice. Washington 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983,
Red Canyon Sheep Company et al. v. Ickes, Secretary o f Interior 98 F.2d 308. 
(1938) U.S. Court of Appeals fpr the District of Columbia. 308-324.
Rimbey, Neil R. Federal Grazing Fees: The Never-Ending Story. University of 
Idaho Cooperative Extension Service Bulletin No. 690, 1986.
Roberts, N. K., and Darwin B, Nielson. "Research on Public Land Pricing 
Policies at USU." Utah Science 24 (1963):95-98.
121
Roberts, Paul. Hoof Prints on Forest Ranges. San Antonio, Texas: Naylor 
Company, 1963.
Rostvold, Gerhard N. and Thomas J. Dudley. A Comparative Analysis o f the
Economic, Financial and Competitive Conditions o f Montana Ranches Using 
Federal Forage and Montana Ranches Without Federal Grazing Allotments. 
Report to Congress and to the Secretaries of the Department of Interior and 
Agriculture. Culver City, CA: Pepperdine University, 1993.
Rowan, R.C., and John P. Workman. "Factors Affecting Utah Range Prices." 
Journal o f Range Management 45 (199.2): 263-266.
Rowley, William D. U.S. Forest Service and Rangelands: A History. Texas A&M, 
1985.
Sidey, Hugh. "Don't Fence Us In." Time 8 March 1993: 39.
Spahr, Ronald W. and Mark A, Sunderman. "Additional Evidence on the 
Homogeneity of the Value of Government Grazing Leases and Changing 
Attributes for Ranch Values." The Journal o f Real Estate Research 10
(1995): 601-616.
Sunderman, Mark A, and Ronald W. Spahr. "Valuation of Government Grazing 
Leases." The Journal o f Real Estate Research 9 (1994): 179-196.
"Taxpayers taken for ride by Western ranchers." USA Today 26 July 1996.
OUR VIEW editorial.
To Provide fo r  Uniform Management o f Livestock Grazing on Federal Land, and 
Other Purposes. S.852. 104th Congress, 1st Session.
Torell, L. Allen, and John P. Doll. The Market Value o f New Mexico Ranches, 
1980-88. Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin No. 748. Las Cruces, NM: 
New Mexico State University, 1990.
Torell, L. Allen, and John M. Fowler. "The Impact of Public Land Grazing Fees 
on New Mexico Ranch Values." The American Society o f Farm Managers and 
Rural Appraisers 50 (1986): 51-55.
Torell, L. Allen, John M. Fowler, Marc E. Kincaid and Jerry M. Hawkes. The 
Importance o f Public Lands to Livestock Production in the U.S. R ange 
Improvement Task Force Report Number No. 32. Las Cruces, NM: New 
Mexico State University, 1992.
Torell, L. Allen, and Marc E. Kincaid. "Public Land Policy and the Market Value 
of New Mexico Ranches, 1979-94." Journal o f Range Management 4 9
(1996): 270-276.
Torell, L. Allen, Larry Van Tassell, Neil R. Rimbey, and Tom E. Barlett. The
Value o f Public Land Forage and the Implications fo r  Grazing Fee Policy: A 
Summery o f the Bureau o f Land Management and U.S. Forest Service 
Incentive Based Grazing Fee Study. Grazing Fee Task Group. Bulletin #767. 
Las Cruces, NM: New Mexico State University, 1993.
1 2 2
Torell, L. Allen, et al. "The Market Value of Public Land Forage Implied from 
Grazing Permits." Current Issues in Rangeland Economics—7994. Ed. Neil 
R. Rimbey and Diane E. Issak. A Western Regional Research Publication. 
Idaho Agriculture Experiment Station. Boise: University of Idaho, 1994.
Tuttle, Larry. "Market Proposal is Half-Hess'd." Unpublished manuscript. 
Available from the author. Portland, OR.
United States v. Fuller 93 S.Ct. 801 (1973).
United States v. Grimaud 31 S.Ct. 480 (1911).
United States v. Jaramillo 190 F,2d 300 (1951).
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service and U.S. Department of Interior, 
Bureau of Land Management. Grazing Fee Review and Evaluation Update o f 
the 1986 Final Report. Washington DC: USDA and USDI, 1992.
U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management. Rangeland Reform  
'94. Draft Environmental Impact Statement. Washington DC: USDI, 1994.
U.S. Department of Interior, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Study o f Fees for  
Grazing Livestock on Federal Lands. Washington DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1977.
Voigt, William. Public Grazing Lands: Use and Misuse by Industry and 
G overnm ent. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, 1976.
Wilkinson, Charles F. Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water and the Future 
o f the West. Washington DC: Island Press, 1992. ■
Winter, J. R. and J. K. Whittaker. "The Relationship Between Private Prices and 
Public-Land Grazing Permits." Land Economics 57 (1981): 414-421.
Workman, John, and Kenneth H. King. "Utah Cattle Ranch Prices." Utah  
Science 43 (1982): 78-81.
APPENDIX A
123
QUESTIONS TO THE PERMITTEES
1) Please describe in brief your ranch and ranching experience. When was 
the ranch bought? How big is it, in both acres and carrying capacity? What 
percentage of capacity is federal? What percentage of the family income does 
it bring in? How long have you and your family been ranching? Is there 
anything else that you want to include?
2) How many AUMs is your allotment(s) currently permitted for? What is its 
actual use? Has this changed over the years?
3) How do you feel about the current allotment system?
4) Do you feel that you or your family paid for your allotment with your 
ranch? How much? How much do you feel it is worth now?
5) How big of an influence do you feel the real estate value of grazing permits 
is in the resistance of ranchers to cuts in their AUM levels?
6) How would you feel about a system that compensated ranchers for forced 
AUM reductions due to the prioritization of other uses? How would you feel 
about a system that compensated ranchers for forced AUM reductions due to 
overgrazing? How about a system that allowed a willing rancher to retire an 
allotment for compensation?
QUESTIONS TO THE NONPERMITTEES
1) Please describe in brief your ranch and ranching experience. When was 
the ranch bought? How big is it, in both acres and carrying capacity? What 
percentage of the family income does it bring in? How long have you and your 
family been ranching? Is there anything else that you want to include?
2) Have you ever had an allotment? If so, how many AUMs was your 
allotment(s) permitted for? Was the actual use different? Did it change over 
the years? What percentage of that ranch's capacity was federal?
3) How do you feel about the current allotment system?
4) Do you feel that ranchers pay for their allotments when they buy their
ranch? How much do you feel a federally leased AUM is worth now as part of
the real estate value of a ranch? Has that changed over the years?
5) How big of an influence do you feel the real estate value of grazing permits 
is in the resistance of ranchers to cuts in their AUM levels?
6) How would you feel about a system that compensated ranchers for forced
AUM reductions due to the prioritization of other uses? How would you feel 
about, a system that compensated ranchers for forced AUM reductions due to 
overgrazing? How about a system that allowed a willing rancher to retire an 
allotment for compensation?
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QUESTIONS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS
1) Please describe in brief your experience with the public land grazing 
allotment system. Have you ever owned or worked on a ranch? Is there 
anything else that you want to include?
2) How do you feel about the current allotment system? How have you feelings 
about this system changed over the years?
3) What, if any, changes would you like to see in the allotment system?
4) Do you feel that ranchers pay for their allotments when they buy their 
ranch? How much do you feel a federally leased AUM is worth now as part of 
the real estate value of a ranch? Has that changed over the years?
5) How big of an influence dp you feel the real estate value of grazing permits 
is in the resistance of ranchers to cuts in their AUM levels?
6) How would you feel about a system that compensated ranchers for forced 
AUM reductions due to the prioritization of other uses? How would you feel 
about a system that compensated ranchers for forced AUM reductions due to 
Overgrazing? How about a system that allowed a willing rancher to retire an 
allotment for compensation?
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEWEES
Name Location Affiliation
Ranchers with Allotments
Bob Germann E n n is MT The Germann Ranch
Brad Little Em m ett ID Little Land and Livestock Company
Bud Eppers . Roswell NM New Mexico Public Lands Council
Dalton Straus Central Point OR Straus Ranches
Jeffrey Menges M orenci AZ Slash Hook Cattle Co.
John Crumley M c A llis te r MT Madison Valley Ranchlands Group
Ken Spann A lm on t CO Spann Ranches
Ranchers Without Allotments
Bill Bowersox M cA llis te r MT F a rm er/R a n ch e r
Harold Yoder K arval CO R ancher
John Ward Klamath Falls OR W ard's Herefords
Ken Rodgers Yuma CO Wagon Wheel Ranch
M ichael Curren W olf Creek MT Sold ranch after interview
Thomas W Brown H ershey NE Owns farm/ranch with three sons
Vernon Sharp B ranson CO The Sharp Cattle Ranch
A cadem ics
Allen Torell Las Cruces NM New Mexico State University
Dell Gardner Provo UT Brigham Young University
Fred O berm iller. C orvallis OR Oregon State University
Jerry Holechek Las Cruces NM New Mexico State University
John Workman Logan UT Utah State University
Larry Van Tassell L aram ie WY University of Wyoming
Robert Ehrhart M issou la MT University of Montana
Federal Land Managers
Berwyn Brown W ashington DC U.S.F.S.
Bruce Fox M issou la MT U.S.F.S. Northern Region
Gerald Henke A lb u q u e rq u e NM / U.S.F.S.
James Owings Lew istow n MT BLM
Jim Nelson S parks NV U.S.F.S.
Larry Hamilton B illin g s MT BLM
M ark Hatcher G unnison CO U.S.F.S.
Terry Holst Lew istow n MT BLM
E n viron m en ta lists
Dan Hienz Reno NV C o n se rv a tio n is t
Jon Marvel H ailey ID Idaho W atersheds Project
Marty Short E vanston WY . C o n se rv a tio n is t
Rose Strickland Reno NV Sierra Club
Sue Navy Crested Butte CO High Country Citizens' Alliance
Susan Schock Silver City NM Gila Watch
Tom Pringle Eugene OR Eugene Hiking Club
O thers
Barry Smith Lew istow n MT A p p ra is e r
Dean Comes Lew istow n MT First National Bank
Jim Wells A lb u q u e rq u e NM Farm Credit Services
John Phelan D illon MT Farm Credit Services
Mark Muro T ucson AZ Arizona Daily Star
Sid Grover Lew istow n MT Lewistown Real Estate
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APPENDIX C 
THE RANGELAND RETIREMENT ACT
A Proposal for Real Rangeland Reform 
Drafted by Jeff Burgess
Whereas livestock grazing is permitted by the federal government on public 
lands administered by the USDA's Forest Service and the USDI's Bureau of Land 
Management; and whereas grazing cannot be continued on many of these 
lands without unacceptable levels of environmental degradation, unresolvable 
conflicts with other uses of the land, or excessive investment by the public in 
the implementation of adequate livestock management; then the following 
legislative proposal is offered to allow for the equitable retirement of the 
aforementioned lands from livestock grazing:
1. All livestock management projects on public lands wherein the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) planning process has been engaged will 
include among the management alternatives to be analyzed a "no-grazing" 
alternative. This alternative, in addition to documenting the environmental
and economic benefits to the public of discontinuing grazing, will include a 
professional assessment of the market value of the affected grazing permit. 
(Legally, federal grazing permits are riot private property and have no market
value. They can be revoked by federal land managers at any time for good 
cause. Traditionally, however, the market value of a ranch's private base 
property is inflated to reflect the assumption that the government will reissue 
the grazing permit to the new owner when the property is sold. Thus, the 
market value of a grazing permit is the difference between the market value 
of a ranch's private base property with the grazing permit attached, minus the 
value of the property without the permit.)
2. Upon the completion of the NEPA analysis, a grazing permittee may opt to 
voluntarily surrender their grazing permit and receive payment from the 
agency equal to the permit's assessed market value. The offer and/or
disbursement of this financial compensation in no way implies or infers that 
possession of a grazing permit gives the holder a property right on federal 
lands. The intent of the money is to serve as Transitional Economic Assistance
■ : ,  1 2 7  ' 
(TEA) to the former permit holder. If the permittee declines to voluntarily
surrender the grazing permit, the responsible federal land manager may still
choose to implement the no-grazing alternative if it's determined that it's the
management alternative that best serves the public interest. The former
grazing permit holder will still receive the appropriate amount of TEA if this
h a p p e n s .
3. Any rancher holding a federal grazing permit may, at any time, choose to 
procure their own professional assessment of the market value of their 
permit. The permittee may then submit the assessment to the agency in order 
to voluntarily surrender their permit and receive the appropriate amount of 
TEA.
4. The permitting of livestock grazing shall be suspended on all lands for 
which a grazing permit has been retired, as described above, for a minimum of
25 years. At the end of this time period, no livestock grazing shall be permitted
to resume until a NEPA analysis is completed and it is determined the 
resumption of grazing would be in the public interest.
5. Congress will create a Range Retirement Fund (RRF) to provide a source of 
money for the Forest Service and the BLM to disburse TEA. The RRF will 
receive a minimum annual appropriation Of $50 million* for as long as it is 
deemed necessary to continue the program. Private individuals, organizations 
(such as conservation groups), and states will also be allowed to contribute to 
the RRF.
6. Federal land managers will be responsible for prioritizing grazing 
allotments under their jurisdiction so that, in the event available RRF funds 
are insufficient, TEA will be first be disbursed to facilitate the suspension of 
grazing on those allotments with the most important resources.
7. This legislation would in no other way alter the existing federal laws 
regarding the permitting of livestock grazing on public lands.
*This is the amount of the deficit the federal government reported it incurred 
managing livestock grazing on public lands in 1990.
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APPENDIX D
The Voluntary R etirem ent Option
Taken from "The Voluntary Retirement Option for 
Federal Public Land Grazing Permittees." by Andy Kerr.
It would be easier—and more just—for the federal government to fairly compensate the 
permit holders as it reduces cattle numbers. Since the government spends substantially 
more than it receives for grazing, in a few years the savings realized by reducing livestock 
numbers can pay for the compensation.
It would be less expensive—fiscally and politically—or the agency to simply buy out the 
problematic grazing permits and save extensive planning, monitoring, research, public
involvement, appeal, litigation and political costs.
Below is a solution to an environmental problem that requires less government 
regulation. Federal law should be changed to:
• Allow a permit holder to choose to not exercise any or all of the
grazin g  perm it.
There would be no penalty to the permittee for not grazing. This would give desirable 
flexibility to ranching operations, decrease livestock grazing damage, and could also 
increase the value of the permit, in the event the permittee later wished to sell. An
allotment with more forage is more attractive to both prospective livestock operators and
conservation buyers.
• Allow existing perm ittees who hold federal grazing perm its to
sell or donate their grazing permit to the federal government,
which would then retire the allotm ent.
A permittee could choose to sell to the federal government, receiving fair market value
for their interests in the permit. Money to fund tax deductions and for acquisition of 
permits by federal agencies could be funded from the Land and Water Conservation Fund, 
by reducing agency grazing budgets, reallocating US Department of Agriculture animal 
damage control subsidies, by using the Range Betterment Fund, or earmarking that small
fraction of the federal grazing fee that actually makes it into the federal treasury.
Alternatively, a permittee could be paid by an individual environmentalist, a state fish 
and wildlife agency, a private conservation organization, a hunting and fishing club, or
anyone else to retire their permit. If it was in the form of a donation to the government, a
federal income tax deduction would be available.
•Reaffirm that grazing the public lands is a privilege, not a right.
Any legislation must expressly state that this change in law in no way increases or 
diminishes any vested interest the permittee may or may not have in public land grazing; 
that grazing the public lands is still a privilege and any reduction in grazing by the 
government is not a compensable loss to the permittee.
Existing laws designed to protect the environment would not change. The administering
agencies could still choose (or be ordered by a court) to reduce, eliminate or further
condition grazing to protect the environment or other public values.
APPENDIX E
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PUBLIC LAND GRAZING FEE LEVELS 1909-1997
Year F.S.* BLM/Taylor Year F.S. BLM/Taylor
1906 .05 1952 .64 .12
1907 .05 1953 .54 .12
1908 .05 1954 .35 .12
1909 .05 1955 .37 .15
1910 .04 1956 .35 .15
1911 .03 .1957 .34 .15
1912 .04 1958 .39 .15
1913 .09 1959 .50 .22
1914 .09 1960 .51 .22
1915 .10 1961 .46 .19
1916 .10 1962 .46 .19
1917 .10 1963 .49 .30
1918 .11 1964 .46 .30
1919 :i3 1965 .46 .30
1920 .13 1966 .51 .33
1921 .13 1967 .56 • 33
1922 .13 1968 .56 .33
1923 .13 1969 .60 .44
1924 .13 1970 .60 .44
1925 .13 1971 .78 .64
1926 .13 197.2 .80 .66
1927 .14 1973 • 91 OO
1928 .12 1974 1.11 1.00
1929 .12 1975 1.11 1.00
1930 .14 1976 1.60 1.51
1931 .14 1977 1.60 1.51
1932 .09 1978 1.60 1.5.1
1933 .07 1979 1.93 1.89
1934 .08 1980 2.41 2.36
1935 .08 1981 2.31 2.31
1936 .13 1982 1.86 1.86
1937 .13 .05 1983 1.40 1.40
1938 .15 .05 1984 1.37 1.37
1939 .13 .05 1985 1.35 1.35
1940 .15 .05 1986 1.35 1.35
1941 .16 .05 1987 1.35 1.35
1942 .19 .05 1988 1.54 1.54
1943. .23 .05 1989 1.86 1.86
1944 .26 .05 1990 1.81 1.81
1945 .25 .05 1991 1.97 1.97
1946 .27 .05 1992 1.92 1.92
1947 .31 .08 1993 1.86 1.86
1948 .40 .08 1994 1.86 1.86
1949 .49 .08 1995 1.98 1.98
1950 .42 .08 1996 1.35 1.35
1951 .51 .12 1997 1.35 1.3 5
From Jacobs; Gardner; Feedstuffs; Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
*Forest Reserve or Forest Service allotments
